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Abstract
We develop a dynamic theory of resource wars and study the conditions under which such
wars can be prevented. The interaction between the scarcity of resources and the incentives
for war in the presence of limited commitment is at the center of our theory. We show that a
key parameter determining the incentives for war is the elasticity of demand. Our rst result
identies a novel externality that can precipitate war: price-taking rms fail to internalize
the impact of their extraction on military action. In the case of inelastic resource demand,
war incentives increase over time and war may become inevitable. Our second result shows
that in some situations, regulation of prices and quantities by the resource-rich country can
prevent war, and when this is the case, there will also be intertemporal distortions. In
particular, resource extraction will tend to be slower than that prescribed by the Hotelling
rule, which is the rate of extraction in the competitive environment. Our third result is that,
due to limited commitment, such regulation can also precipitate war in some circumstances
in which war is avoided in the competitive environment.
Keywords: Trade, International Conicts, War, Exhaustible Resources
JEL Classication: F10, F51, , H56, Q32.
We would like to thank V.V. Chari, Larry Jones, Antonio Merlo, Gerard Padró i Miquel, Kristopher Ramsay,
Stergios Skaperdas, and seminar participants at Berkeley, Canadian Institute of Advanced Research, Kellogg
MEDS, New York University, and Princeton-Yale Conference on War and Trade for comments. We thank Nick
Werquin for excellent research assistance.
yMassachusetts Institute of Technology. e-mail: daron@mit.edu.
zYale University. email: m.golosov@yale.edu.
xYale University. email: a.tsyvinski@yale.edu.
{Columbia University. e-mail: pyared@columbia.edu.
1 Introduction
Control over natural resources has been one of the key determinants of wars.1 An early study of
causes of modern wars during the 1878 to 1918 period by Bakeless (1921) argued that fourteen of
the twenty major wars had signicant economic causes, often related to conict over resources.
He emphasized
[t]he rise of industrialism has led to the struggle for ... raw materials.
For example, in the War of the Pacic (1879-1884), Chile fought against a defensive alliance of
Bolivia and Peru for the control of guano mineral deposits. The war was precipitated by the rise
in the value of the deposits due to their extensive use in agriculture. Chiles victory increased
the size of its treasury by 900 percent.2
Westing (1986) argues that many of the wars in the twentieth century had an important
resource dimension. As examples, he cites the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962), the
Six DayWar (1967), and the Chaco War (1932-1935).3 More recently, Saddam Husseins invasion
of Kuwait in 1990 was a result of the dispute over the Rumaila oil eld. In Resource Wars (2001),
Klare argues that following the end of the Cold War control of valuable natural resources has
become increasingly important and these resources will become a primary motivation for wars
in the future. The famous Carter Doctrine, which states that
Any attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf ... will be
repelled by any means necessary, including military force,
is just one facet of this perspective.4
This paper develops an economic theory of resource wars and claries the conditions under
which such wars can be prevented. We consider the dynamic interactions between a resource-
rich and a resource-poor country, which enable us to capture the e¤ect of the increasing scarcity
1 In his classic, A Study of War, Wright (1942) devotes a chapter to the relationship between war and resources.
Another classical reference, Statistics of Deadly Quarrels by Richardson (1960), extensively discusses economic
causes of war, including the control of sources of essential commodities.More recently, Findlay and ORourke
(2007) document the historical relationship between international trade and military conict.
2Bakeless (1921) writes: The desire of Chile to secure a share in the nitrate trade, of Bolivia to hold nitrate
deposits [...], and of Peru to maintain its supremacy in the guano trade explain the motivation of the Nitrate
War.
3The Algerian War of Independence was in part fought because France was reluctant to lose Algerias rich
oil deposits. An important cause of the Six Day War between Israel and Arab states was the struggle for water
resources of the Jordan River and other rivers in the area. The Chaco War of 1932-1935 was a successful war
by Paraguay against Bolivia to annex the Gran Chaco area that was incorrectly thought to contain signicant
deposits of oil.
4The Carter Doctrine was used in 1990 to justify the rst Gulf War. Following the oil shocks in the 1970s, the
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger told the editors of the Business Week that the United States was prepared
to go to war over oil and that Washington would have no hesitation to use force where theres some actual
strangulation of the industrialized world. Klare (2001) argues that the Caspian Basin and the South China Sea
are the most likely regions to witness large scale warfare over oil in the future. War over water is another pressing
issue in international politics. For example, in 1980 Boutros Boutros-Ghali commented that The next war in
our region will be over the waters of the Nile, not politics.
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of nite resources. Our approach combines the classic Hotelling (1931) model of exhaustible
resources with a dynamic guns and butter model of armament and war along the lines of
Powell (1993). A key friction in our model is the presence of limited commitment, as countries
cannot commit to future policies. We use the model to ask three main questions. First, what
is the e¤ect of resource scarcity on the likelihood of war? Second, how does the threat of war
a¤ect resource extraction and prices? Finally, how are the realization of war and the dynamics
of resource extraction a¤ected by market structure?
In our framework, the resource-poor country (country A) exchanges a non-exhaustible good
(a consumptiongood) for an exhaustible good (oil) with the resource-rich country (country
S). At any date, country A can arm and invade country S; higher armaments result in country
A capturing a greater portion of the remaining resources in country S. We consider two di¤erent
market structures. In the rst market structure, the competitive environment, the stock of the
exhaustible resource in country S is distributed among a set of perfectly competitive price-taking
rms which supply the world market. Country A consumers purchase the resource at the world
market price, unless there is a war (in which case country A captures part of the endowment and
the rest of the stock is destroyed). In the second market structure, the monopolistic environment,
the government of country S regulates the price and the level of production of the resource
(for example, by setting nonlinear taxes). More specically, following the armament decision by
country A, country S makes a take-it-or-leave-it price-quantity o¤er to country A, where country
A has the option of declaring war if this is preferable to accepting the o¤er. We characterize the
equilibrium in Markovian strategies.
In both of these environments the elasticity of the demand for resource (or oil) plays a critical
role in shaping war incentives. If the elasticity of demand for oil is below 1, the value of the
outstanding stock of oil rises as the resource is depleted. This implies that the incentives for
country A to arm and ght country S rise over time. In contrast, if this elasticity exceeds 1,
the value of the outstanding stock of oil declines with time, as do country As incentives to ght
over these resources. For these reasons, the elasticity of demand will play a crucial role in the
characterization of equilibrium dynamics. Given that empirically relevant estimates of elasticity
are below 1, we focus our discussion on the implications of the model for elasticities below 1
(though we also provide the results for the converse case).5
Our rst main result is that a novel externality emerges in the competitive environment
and can precipitate war. Specically, rms in country S do not internalize their impact on
country As war incentives. In the case with inelastic demand, rms do not take into account
that their extraction decision increases country As incentives to invade country S, since these
incentives rise with resource scarcity. Moreover, if country A is militarily su¢ ciently powerful
(i.e., it can acquire a large enough portion of the outstanding oil during war), then country A will
eventually invade country S once the stock of oil has been su¢ ciently depleted. Firms anticipate
5Several studies estimate the short-run demand elasticity for oil to be between 0.01 and 0.1, while the long-run
elasticity is found to be higher but still less than 1 (see, for example, Gately and Huntington, 2002).
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this prospect of future war by increasing their extraction today, which in turn increases country
As incentives to engage in war even earlier, an e¤ect which we refer to as the unraveling of
peace.
Motivated by the existence of this novel externality, the rest of the paper studies whether
regulation of prices and quantities by country S acting as a monopolist, the monopolistic
environment, can mitigate this externality and prevent war. Our second main result shows
that in some situations, regulation by country Ss government can prevent the realization of war,
and that this occurs through the introduction of intertemporal distortions. More specically, if
demand for the resource is inelastic, then resource extraction in the monopolistic environment
occurs slower than that prescribed by the Hotelling rule, which is the rate of extraction in the
competitive environment. This is because under inelastic demand, country As armaments and
incentives to declare war increase as the resource is depleted. Thus, country S has an incentive
to slow down the rate of extraction so as to reduce the incentives for war and reduce the cost of
armaments for which it is paying indirectly, and this causes the shadow value of the outstanding
stock of oil to rise at a slower pace than under the Hotelling rule.
Our nal result is that, under some circumstances, regulation of prices and quantities by
country S can in fact precipitate war in circumstances in which war is avoided in the competitive
environment. This result emerges because of the presence of limited commitment. Specically,
because country S cannot commit to a long term contract with country A, country A must arm
in every period, even under peace, in order to enforce such a contract and obtain favorable terms
of trade. In contrast, in the competitive environment, country A only arms if it is going to war.
Because in the monopolistic environment country S implicitly compensates country A for the
cost of this continual armament with its o¤er in every single period, if this cost of continually
arming is su¢ ciently high, then this will induce war.6
Despite the importance of international conict for economic and social outcomes and the
often-hypothesized links between natural resources and international conict, there are only a
handful of papers discussing these issues. Our work is related to the literature on international
wars which explores how countries bargain to avoid war (e.g., Powell, 1993, 1999, Schwarz and
Sonin, 2004, Skaperdas, 1992, and Yared, 2010). In particular, our work builds on Schwarz
and Sonin (2004) since we consider how international transfers can serve to sustain peace in a
dynamic environment. In contrast to this work, our focus is on the transfer of nite resources,
and we study the two-way interaction between dynamic intertemporal resource-allocation and
the threat of war.7 In this regard, our paper is related to Hotellings (1931) seminal work (see
also Dasgupta and Heal, 1979, and more recent contributions by Pindyck, 1979, and Kremer
6This result is related to the fact that in any dynamic guns and butter type models, like Powell (1993), countries
can go to war in order to avoid having to incur the cost of future armament under peace.
7For related work on bargaining in the shadow of conict, see also Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), Anderlini,
Gerardi, and Laguno¤ (2009), Baliga and Sjöström (2004), Chassang and Padró i Miquel (2010), Dixit (1987),
Esteban and Ray (2008), Fearon (1995), Garnkel, Skaperdas, and Syropoulos (2009), Hirshleifer (1995), and
Jackson and Morelli (2009).
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and Morcom, 2000). Our work also contributes to the political economy of trade literature
(e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1995, Bagwell and Staiger, 1990, 2001, Maggi, 1999, Maggi and
Rodriguez-Clare, 2007). Within this literature, our paper is most closely related to Antrás
and Padró i Miquel (2009), who study how a dominant country can a¤ect its trading partners
domestic politics. They show how lobbying type activities by the dominant country can be used
for a¤ecting policies and the terms of trade. In contrast to this literature, we emphasize how
the ability to arm and ght wars over resources a¤ects patterns of trade. Finally our work is
related to the large literature on the political economy of natural resources (e.g., Tornell and
Lane, 1999, Ross, 1999, Caselli, 2005, Robinson and Torvik, 2006, Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin,
2009). Di¤erently from this literature, our focus is on the international dimension of conict
over resources and we abstract from domestic politics.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the general environment. Section 3
describes the competitive environment and Section 4 describes the monopolistic environment.
Section 5 considers extensions. Section 6 concludes and the Appendix includes additional proofs
not included in the text.
2 Environment
Time is discrete and denoted by t = 0; :::;1. There are two countries, A and S, and two
goods, an exhaustible resource, to which we refer to as oil, and a perishable (non-resource)
consumption good. Each country is inhabited by a continuum of mass 1 of identical households
(or alternatively, by a representative household). We assume that the governments in both
countries maximize the intertemporal utility of their citizens (of the representative household in
their country). In view of this, we refer to actions by governments and countries interchangeably.
Households in country A receive the following ow utility from their consumption of the
resource and the consumption good:
u
 
xAt

+ cAt , (1)
where xAt  0 corresponds to their consumption of the resource and cAt R 0 refers to the
consumption good. The utility function u () is strictly increasing and concave, i.e., u0 () > 0 and
u00 () < 0, and satises the following Inada conditions: limx!0 u0 (x) =1 and limx!1 u0 (x) = 0.
For simplicity, we assume that households in country S do not value the resource, and thus their
utility is derived only from the consumption good:
cSt , (2)
where cSt R 0 refers to the consumption good. Households in both countries have a common
discount factor  2 (0; 1) :
In each period both countries are endowed with an exogenous perishable amount of the
consumption good. We normalize the endowment of this good for each country to zero (recall
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that negative consumption is allowed). In addition, country S is endowed with e0 > 0 units of
the exhaustible resource (oil) in period 0. To be consumed, the resource needs to be extracted
and extraction is at zero cost. We also assume that the amount extracted is non-storable and
has to be consumed in the same period, which prevents country S from selling the stockof
the resource. We denote by xt  0 the amount of extraction of the resource in period t: The
remaining stock of the non-extracted resource in period t+ 1, et+1; follows the law of motion
et+1 = et   xt: (3)
Country S extracts the resource and trades it for the consumption good with country A:We
consider several trade environments in Sections 3 and 4.
In addition to trading, we allow country A to make two additional decisions in each period:
how much to arm and whether to declare war against county S: The armament technology
works as follows. At every date t, country A can choose a level of armament mt 2 [0; m]
which has a per capita cost of l(mt) units of the consumption good. We assume that l ()
satises l0 () > 0; l00 ()  0, and l (0) = 0. The payo¤ from war depends on the amount of
armament. If country A has armament mt and attacks country S that has et units of the
resource, it obtains fraction w(mt) of et, while the remaining fraction 1   w(mt) is destroyed.8
We assume that w () satises w0 () > 0, w00 ()  0, w(m) 2 [0; 1] for all m with w (0) = 0 and
limm! mw0 (m) = 0, which imposes su¢ cient diminishing returns to armaments to ensure an
interior level of equilibrium armaments. In most of the analysis, we allow for m =1, in which
case, mt 2 [0;1) and limm!1w0 (m) = 0. We use an indicator variable fT = 0 to denote that
no war occurred in periods t = 0; ::; T and fT = 1 to denote that war occurred in some period
t  T:
If country A, after choosing mt units of armament, attacks country S and the remaining
endowment is et, the payo¤ to country A is V (w(mt)et)   l(mt), where l (mt) is the cost of
armament, incurred by the representative household in terms of the consumption good, and
V (w(mt)et) is the continuation value of the representative household in that country starting
with the ownership of the resource endowment of w (mt) et (since after war, the ownership of
a fraction w (mt) of the remaining resource is transferred to the country A government). Since
the government will use this stock to maximize the utility of its citizens, we have
V (w (mt) et) = maxfxt+k;et+k+1g1k=0
1X
k=0
ku (xt+k) (4)
8To facilitate interpretation, we model the outcome of war as deterministic in particular, with country A
grabbing a xed fraction of the resource. This is largely without loss of any generality. All of our results apply
to an environment in which the outcome of war is stochastic, provided that after war, the two countries never
interact again. For example, we can dene w (mt) as the probability that country A receives a fraction H of the
endowment and 1  w (mt) as the probability that it receives a fraction L < H of the endowment.
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subject to the resource and nonnegativity constraints, i.e.,
et+1+k = et+k   xt+k for k > 0; (5)
et+1 = w (mt) et   xt; and (6)
xt+k; et+k  0 for k  0. (7)
In the event of a war, the payo¤ to country S is given by  < 0. In what follows, we impose
the following relatively weak condition on the utility function u () (without explicitly stating
it).
Assumption 1 There exist some (; ; ) 2 R3 such that u (x)  x +  8x > 0.
Assumption 1 is a simple su¢ cient condition to ensure that the value of (4) subject to (5)-(6)
is nite (bounded from below) starting from any w (mt) et > 0 and thus V () is well dened.
Without any restriction on u (), any feasible solution might lead to minus innite value.9
For future reference, it is also useful to dene m(e) as the optimal amount of armament for
country A if it attacks country S when country S has e units of resource endowment. Namely:
m (e)  argmax
m0
V (w (m) e)  l (m) . (8)
Given our assumptions on u (), w (), and l () (in particular, the Inada conditions) as well as
Assumption 1, it is straightforward to see that m (e) is well-dened, satises m (e) > 0 and is
a continuously di¤erentiable function of e for all e > 0.
One of the key variables in our analysis will be the elasticity of demand dened as u0 (x) = (xu00 (x)) :
For now we prove the following useful result about the relationship between the comparative
statics of m with respect to e and the elasticity of demand, which we will use throughout the
paper.
Proposition 1 If  u0 (x) = (xu00 (x)) < 1 for all x, thenm0 (e) < 0. Conversely, if  u0 (x) = (xu00 (x)) >
1 for all x, then m0 (e) > 0.
9To see that Assumption 1 ensures that V (et) is bounded from below for any et > 0, consider the consumption
path given by et+k+1 = et+k for  2 (0; 1) with  chosen such that  < 1, which is always feasible. Then
1X
k=0
ku

(1  )ket


1X
k=0


k
 ((1  ) et) + 
1  
=
 ((1  ) et)
1   k + 1   >  1
Clearly, Assumption 1 is always satised if u (0) >  1. Moreover, for the constant elasticity of substitution
class of utility functions, introduced in (17) below, it is satised by choosing  = 1= (1  1=),  = 1  1=, and
 =  1= (1  1=).
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Proof. See Appendix.
The elasticity of demand captures the value of resource consumption (in terms of the non-
resource good) as resource consumption declines. Intuitively, as resource consumption decreases
its price increases. The elasticity of demand determines which of these two e¤ects dominates
in determining the value of resource consumption. When this elasticity is less than one, the
price e¤ect dominates and thus the overall value of resource consumption rises as the quantity
consumed declines. From (4), the value of the resource endowment to country A is also related
to these competing e¤ects. If the elasticity of demand is less than one, the marginal value
of resource consumption, and thus the value to country A of capturing a greater stock of the
resource, is greater when the resource is more scarce. From (8), this implies that country A will
be willing to invest more in armaments in order to capture a larger fraction of the remaining
resource endowment when there is less of it. The converse result contained in Proposition 1 has
an analogous intuition.
3 Competitive Environment
We start by considering a competitive environment in which trade occurs at market clearing
prices and both buyers and sellers take these prices as given. This environment allows us
to highlight the key economic forces that determine incentives to ght and to illustrate the
externalities in the competitive environment.
3.1 Markov Perfect Competitive Equilibrium
In the competitive environment, there is a unit measure of rms in country S. Each rm is
labeled by i and owns an equal fraction of the total natural resource endowment of country S:
Firm i extracts resources xSit and sells them in a competitive market at price pt in units of the
consumption good. All prots are rebated to households of country S as dividends. We next
dene a notion of competitive equilibrium for this environment. This denition requires some
care, since producers in country S are price takers, but they must also recognize the likelihood
of war, which results from the strategic choices of the government of country A. We dene the
notion of equilibrium in two steps. First, we impose price taking and market clearing for all
relevant Arrow-Debreu commodities, i.e., for the resource at each date following any history (by
Walrass law, this guarantees market clearing for the consumption good). Second, we study the
problem of country A taking the relationship between the probability of war and these prices as
given.
Price-taking implies that each rm i in country S chooses extraction plan

xSit
	1
t=0
to max-
imize its expected prots at time t = 0,
max
fxSitg1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
tptx
S
it (9)
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subject to the constraints
eit+1 = eit   xSit if ft = 0
xSit = 0 if ft = 1; and
xSit; eit+1  0 for all t  0:
The second constraint stems from the fact that rm i loses its endowment if country A declares
war. The solution to this problem implies that, when ft = 0,
xSit
8><>:
= 0
2 [0; eit]
= eit
if pt < pt+1 Pr fft+1 = 0g
if pt = pt+1 Pr fft+1 = 0g
if pt > pt+1 Pr fft+1 = 0g
. (10)
Equation (10) captures the fact that rms take into account not only future prices but also the
future probability of war in deciding how much to extract today.
Similarly, the representative household in country A chooses the demand for resource xAt as
a solution to
max
xt0
u(xt)  ptxt; (11)
which gives us the standard optimality condition
u0(xAt ) = pt. (12)
We denote the total supply of the resource by xSt . Market clearing implies that the price
sequence fptg1t=0 must be such that
xSt = x
A
t (13)
for all t.
In addition, the country A government can impose a lump sum tax on its citizens of size
l (mt) in order order to invest in armament mt, and it can choose to attack country S at any
date.
More specically, we consider the following sequence of events. Since the game is trivial after
the war has occurred, we only focus on the histories for which war has not occurred yet (i.e., on
histories where ft 1 = 0):
1. Country As government chooses a level of armament mt  0.
2. Firms in country S commit to extraction xSt  0 and households in country A commit
to consumption xAt at prices pt in the event that country A does not attack country S at
stage 3.
3. Country As government decides whether or not to attack country S:
4. Extraction and consumption take place.
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Note that in stage 2, rms and households trade contingent claims on the resource, where
the contingency regards whether or not war is declared at stage 3.10
We can now dene a Markov Perfect Competitive Equilibrium (MPCE) formally. For the
same reason that the game is trivial after war has occurred, we only dene strategies for dates t
for which ft 1 = 0. Denote the strategy of the government of country A as ' which consists of a
pair of functions 'm and 'f : In each period, the function 'm assigns a probability distribution
over armament decisionsmt as a function of et: The function 'f assigns a probability distribution
with which country S attacks as a function of
 
et;mt; pt; x
S
t ; x
A
t

.11
Firms and households take the sequences of prices and policies by the government of country
A as given. It is important to note that because we are focusing on Markov perfect equilibria,
even if war is expected with probability 1 at date t, their choices do take into account the
continuation strategy of the government and the future sequence of prices from t+ 1 onward in
the event that war is not actually declared at t. Therefore, allocations and prices conditional
on war never being declared need to be specied as part of the equilibrium. To do this, let us
dene a sequence   et ; pt ; xSt ; xAt 	1t=0, where each element at t corresponds to the values of 
et; pt; x
S
t ; x
A
t

which would emerge if ft 1 = 0. Given such a sequence , one can dene UA (et )
as the welfare of (the representative household in) country A starting from et conditional on
ft 1 = 0. Given this denition, the period t payo¤ to country A, starting from et under ft 1 = 0
and conditional on some choice (mt; ft), is
(1  ft)
 
u
 
xAt
  ptxAt + UA  et+1+ ftV (w (mt) et )  l (mt) : (14)
The rst term is the value in case of no war, while the second term is the continuation value
following war.
Before providing a formal denition, we also note a potential source of uninteresting multi-
plicity in this environment. Consider a situation in which et = 0. If u (0) is nite, then country
A would be indi¤erent between choosing ft = 0 on the one hand and mt = 0 and ft = 1 on the
other. Moreover, if u (0) =  1, then country As strategy is not well-dened. Depending on
which action country A chooses at zero endowment, one can then change incentives at earlier
stages and construct di¤erent equilibria. We propose a solution which deals with both of these
issues simultaneously where the details are discussed in the Appendix. Specically, we focus on
a renement of equilibria where war decisions at all et are optimal in the presence of an additive
cost of war equal to  > 0 for country A. In that case, the expressions we have here correspond
10We could alternatively simplify the timing of the game by allowing country A to arm and to make its attacking
decisions in the rst stage, and then, if the attack did not occur, households and rms would trade in the second
stage. Under our notion of equilibrium, these two setups are equivalent. We chose this setup to be consistent
with the timing of the game in Section 4.
11Throughout the paper we focus on Markovian equilibria for two reasons. First, we believe that these capture
the main commitment problems shaping economic incentives in a clean and economical manner. Second, as we
explain further in subsection 5.4, even though the structure of subgame perfect equilibria appears similar, a tight
characterization of the set of these equilibria is challenging.
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to the limiting economy where  ! 0 (in the Appendix, we analyze the problem for an arbitrary
 > 0; focusing on  ! 0 in the text simplies expressions). Moreover, we impose that war
decisions at et = 0 are consistent with war decisions for an arbitrarily small endowment (in
the limit, zero endowment). The presence of the additive cost of war  implies that war never
occurs at et = 0 if u (0) is nite, though it is still the case that war may occur at et = 0 if
u (0) =  1 depending on the limiting behavior of war incentives. Throughout, MPCE refers to
such equilibria or renedMPCE (without this qualier) as dened next.12
Denition 1 A Markov Perfect Competitive Equilibrium (MPCE) consists of ' and  such that
at each t:
1. 'm maximizes (14) for every et > 0 in ,
2. 'f maximizes (14) given mt for every
 
et ; pt ; xSt ; xAt

with et > 0 in ,
3.  satises (3), (10), (12), and (13) with Pr fft+1 = 1g = 'f
 
et+1;mt+1; pt+1; xSt+1; xAt+1

,
and
4. If et = 0, then ' (et ) = lime!0 ' (e) where ' (e) denotes the strategy for country A that
maximizes (14) for some cost of war  > 0.
The rst three requirements are standard. They ensure that the government in country A
makes its armament and ghting decisions optimally today, taking into account its future be-
havior and that of the private sector in the event that war is not declared today. Furthermore,
rms and households behave optimally today, taking into account the future behavior of the
government in the event that war is not declared today. They also impose that the continuation
equilibrium in the event that war does not happen today must always be such that households
and rms optimize, markets clear, and country A chooses its best response. The fourth require-
ment is the renement mentioned above. It imposes that best response for country A (and in
particular its war decision) at zero endowment is the limit of best responses in the perturbed
economy as the endowment approaches zero. The fact that this needs to be the case for some
 > 0 (rather than for all  or for some specic value) makes this a weaker renement which
is nonetheless su¢ cient for our purposes, and in the Appendix we analyze the problem for an
arbitrary  > 0 which applies at all et.
3.2 Analysis
Our rst result establishes the existence of MPCE in the above-described environment.
Lemma 1 An MPCE exists.
12Put di¤erently, this renement is in the spirit of trembling hand perfectionand rules out equilibria supported
by weakly dominated strategies for country A.
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Proof. See Appendix.
We next characterize MPCEs. As a benchmark, it is useful to consider a case when country
A cannot arm and declare war i.e., focus on the case where ft = 0 for all t: In that case there is
no uncertainty and the rst-order conditions to (10), (12), and (13) imply that the equilibrium
prices pt must satisfy
pt+1 = pt: (15)
This is a market form of the famous Hotelling rule and requires that prices of the exhaustible
resource grow at the rate of interests, which is also equal to the discount rate, (1  ) =. The
intuition is straightforward: since producers are price-takers and can extract the resource at no
cost, there will only be positive extraction at all dates if they make the same discounted prots
by extracting at any date, which implies (15). Moreover, given the Inada conditions on the
utility function and the rst-order condition (12), zero extraction at any date is not consistent
with equilibrium. Hence (15) must hold in any MPCE.
The connection between (15) and the Hotelling rule can be seen more explicitly by using
(10), (12), and (13), which imply that the sequence of resource consumption fxtg1t=0 must satisfy
u0(xt+1) = u0(xt) (16)
at all t, which is the familiar form of the Hotelling rule (with zero extraction costs).
We next turn to country As armament and war decisions and characterize MPCE. We rst
consider pure-strategy equilibria (where 'f is either 0 or 1 at each date). This gives us our
rst result, the unraveling of peace because of the externalities that the production decisions
of price-taking rms create on others, wars cannot be delayed in pure-strategy equilibria.
Proposition 2 In any pure-strategy MPCE:
1. War can only occur at t = 0 along the equilibrium path.
2. The equilibrium sequence of resource extraction, xt, satises (16) for all t:
Proof. Suppose country A attacks at date T > 0 with probability 1. From (10), rms extract
all the resource before date T; so that et = 0 for some t  T: This implies that xT = 0: We now
show that there is necessarily a deviation that is strictly protable. Consider two cases. First,
suppose u(0) is nite. In this case, the fourth requirement of the denition of MPCE implies that
country A attacking at T cannot be an equilibrium, yielding a contradiction. Second, suppose
that u(0) =  1 and let the date at which the endowment is depleted be t  1, which implies
that et 1 > 0. In this case the equilibrium payo¤ for country A from the viewpoint of date t  1
is  1: Consider the following deviation: country A chooses the level of armament m(et 1) as
given by (8), and attacks country S at date t  1. This deviation has payo¤
V (w(m(et 1))et 1)  l(m(et 1)) >  1;
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since et 1 > 0. This implies that war at T cannot be a best response. Since this argument is
true for any T > 0, it must be that any war can only occur at date t = 0. This establishes the
rst part of the proposition.
To derive the second part, note that if a war occurs at time 0, the rst-order conditions to
(4) imply that xt must satisfy (16). If no attack occurs at t =0, the rst part implies that ft = 0
for all t and the argument preceding the proposition establishes (16).
This proposition shows that in pure-strategy equilibria, wars cannot be delayed. The intuition
is simple and directly related to the externalities across rms: if there is a war at time T , price-
taking rms will deplete their entire endowment before T , and this will encourage war to be
declared earlier. While the fact that country S rms fail to internalize their impact on future
war decisions is at the heart of Proposition 2, lack of commitment by country A also plays a
role. More specically, country As armament and war decisions are chosen to maximize (4)
at each date. Therefore, the unraveling of peace and war at date 0 occur because country A
would otherwise optimally choose to go to war at some future date T . Suppose that country As
consumers are strictly better o¤at time t = 0 under permanent peace than under immediate war.
In such a situation, country As government could make its citizens better o¤ by committing at
t = 0 to not going to war in the future. Not only would this commitment prevent the unraveling
of peace, but it would make country S households strictly better o¤ also since they would be
receiving positive payments from country A instead of receiving the payo¤  < 0 from war.
Notably, Proposition 2 also implies that along the equilibrium path, consumption of the
resource satises the Hotelling rule, (16), and that there are no intertemporal distortions. If there
is no war at t = 0, then the equilibrium is identical to the benchmark competitive equilibrium in
which war is not possible. If there is war at t = 0, then country A seizes a fraction w (m (e0))
of the initial endowment and it extracts resources according to (16) since this maximizes the
welfare of households in country A.
To further characterize under which conditions wars may occur and to explore the possibility
of mixed-strategy equilibria, we restrict attention to utility functions that imply a constant
elasticity of demand for the resource. This is the same as the commonly used class of constant
relative risk aversion (CRRA) or iso-elastic preferences:
u(x) =
x1 1=   1
1  1= (17)
for  > 0. Clearly, the elasticity of demand for the exhaustible resource is constant and equal
to  u0 (x) = (xu00 (x)) = . As we will see, when  < 1, which is the empirically relevant case
for oil (and perhaps also for other exhaustible resources), total spending on the exhaustible
resource increases over time as its endowment is depleted because the price increase dominates
the reduction in quantity. When preferences take this form, we can generalize Proposition 2 to
any MPCE (i.e., also those in mixed strategies) provided that  6= 1.
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Proposition 3 Suppose u(x) satises (17) and  6= 1. Then in any mixed-strategy MPCE:
1. War can only occur at t = 0 along the equilibrium path, and
2. The equilibrium sequence of resource extraction, xt, satises (16) for all t:
Proof. See Appendix.
To understand the intuition for this proposition it is useful to consider how country As incen-
tives to declare war change over time as the endowment of the exhaustible resource declines. To
do this, consider the special case where w () is a step function. In particular, if country A invests
~m > 0 in armament, it will receive the entire remaining endowment of the exhaustible resource,
i.e., w( ~m) = 1. If it invests less, it will obtain none of the endowment. This functional form
implies that country A is e¤ectively choosing between zero armaments (and no war), and arma-
ments equal to ~m to obtain the entire endowment of the resource. Suppose further that country
A is choosing between going to war at time t and permanent peace thereafter. Thus if it does not
declare war at time t starting from some endowment et, the subsequent allocations are given by
the standard competitive equilibrium allocations, denoted by fext+k (et) ; ept+k (et) ; et+k (et)g1k=0 :
It is straightforward to show that ext+k (et) = (1  ) et+k (et), ept+k (et) = (ext+k (et)) 1=, andet+k+1 (et) = et+k (et)   ext+k (et) : This implies that the payo¤ to country A in period t from
not going to war is equal to
UC(et) =
1X
k=0
ku(ext+k (et))  1X
k=0
kept+k (et) ext+k (et)
=
1X
k=0
ku(ext+k (et))  (1  ) 1= e1 1=t :
If country A invests ~m in armament in period t and declares war, then, since w( ~m) = 1; its
payo¤ is given by
V (w( ~m)et)  l( ~m) =
1X
k=0
ku(ext+k (et))  l( ~m):
This implies that the di¤erence between the payo¤s from war and no war is equal to
V (w( ~m)et)  l( ~m)  UC(et) = (1  ) 1= e1 1=t   l( ~m):
Since fetg1t=0 is a decreasing sequence by construction, this expression monotonically decreases to
zero if  is greater than 1 and increases towards innity if  is less than 1. Therefore, depending
on the elasticity of demand for the resource, the payo¤ from war either monotonically converges
to zero or becomes unbounded. Which of these two cases applies depends on whether the pay-
ments that country Amakes to country S in competitive equilibrium,
P1
k=0 
kept+k (et) ext+k (et) ;
converge to zero or innity as et declines. This logic allows us to show in the proof of Proposition
3 that if demand is elastic ( is greater than one), incentives to ght must be decreasing for
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country A: In particular, if it weakly prefers peace to war in any period t; it strictly prefers
peace in all the subsequent periods. Alternatively, if the demand for the resource is inelastic (
is less than one), incentives to ght must be increasing and country A eventually prefers war in
which case the arguments of Proposition 2 apply directly. In particular in this case war must
occur with probability 1 independently of the cost of armaments l( ~m) and the cost of war to
country S. It is straightforward to see that the same conclusion holds if country A could, as in
our model, choose to go to war at any date it wishes.
This special case illustrates the key intuition underlying Proposition 3. More generally, war
has an additional cost for country A, which is that a fraction 1 w(m(e)) of the endowment is
lost in war. If this cost is su¢ ciently high, country A may prefer not to attack country S even if
its equilibrium payments
P1
k=0 
kept+k (et) ext+k (et) diverge to innity. All the same, the main
insights and the factors a¤ecting the comparison between war and no war remain the same as
in the case where w( ~m) = 1:
The next proposition contains the main result for the competitive environment. It charac-
terizes the conditions under which equilibrium involves war.
Proposition 4 Suppose u(x) satises (17) and  6= 1.
1. Suppose  > 1. Then there exists be > 0 such that if e0 < be, then the unique MPCE has
permanent peace, and if e0 > be, then in any MPCE war occurs in period 0 with probability
1.
2. Suppose  < 1. Then there exists bw < 1 such that if limm! mw(m) < bw; then the unique
MPCE has permanent peace, and if limm! mw(m) > bw, then in any MPCE war occurs in
period 0 with probability 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition therefore shows that in the empirically more relevant case where  < 1,
provided that countryA is capable of capturing most of the remaining endowment of the resource,
the equilibrium will involve war at the initial date. The intuition for this result follows from
Proposition 3. When  < 1, spending on the resource and incentives to declare war increase
over time. If, by spending the necessary resources, country A can capture a su¢ cient fraction of
the remaining endowment of the resource, captured here by the condition that limm! mw(m) >bw, then it will necessarily nd it optimal to declare war at some point. But we know from
Proposition 2 that if war will occur in pure strategies, it must occur at the initial date, because
anticipating war, country S producers would always deplete the entire resource and this induces
country A to jump the gun and declare war at the initial date.
Notably, this conclusion is independent of the costs of war to either country (i.e., the function
l () for country A, and  for country S). In particular, this proposition applies even if  =  1.
In this case, of course, war is extremely costly to the citizens of country S, but under our
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assumption that resource extraction takes place competitively, rms in this country can take no
action to stave o¤ a very costly war. This is one of the main motivations for our analysis of the
monopolisticenvironment, where such actions will be possible. For future reference, we state
this simple implication of Proposition 4 as a corollary.
Corollary 1 If  < 1 and if limm! mw(m) is su¢ ciently close to 1, then war will take place at
date 0 even if  =  1.
Proposition 4 does not cover the knife-edge case where  = 1, which turns out to be more
complicated. When  = 1, the demand for the resource has unitary elasticity and the equilibrium
payment ptxt is constant over time (independent of et). In this case, when there exists a pure-
strategy equilibrium with no war, there also exist mixed-strategy equilibria. In particular,
country A might mix with a constant probability between war and no war at each date. When
such a mixed-strategy equilibrium exists, it will involve equilibrium prices that rise at a faster
rate than (1  )= and equilibrium allocations and prices will deviate from the Hotelling rule
(16). Since such equilibria are only possible in the knife-edge case where  = 1, we do not dwell
on them.
The analysis of the competitive environment shows that the extraction patterns and prices
always satisfy the Hotelling rule. We will see that this is not true in the monopolistic environment
we study next.
4 Monopolistic Environment
From the point of view of country S, the competitive equilibrium is suboptimal for two reasons.
The rst is the standard price e¤ect. Each producer, by extracting more, is reducing the price
faced by other producers. In traditional trade models, this price e¤ect is sometimes internalized
by using optimalimport and export taxes. The second is a novel externality resulting from the
military actions of country A in response to the equilibrium path of prices. Recall the second part
of Proposition 4 with w( ~m) = 1 and  < 1. In this case, war is unavoidable under competitive
markets and occurs immediately, even though the cost of war,   , may be arbitrarily high for
country S. War occurs because, as the price of the resource increases, payments from country A
households to country S rms become arbitrarily large. Yet price-taking rms do not internalize
that high resource prices increase incentives to ght for country A: If country S could somehow
reduce these payments, it may be able to avoid war. The government of country S might, for
example, regulate the price and quantity traded of the resource in order to prevent war or to
improve the welfare of its citizens. In this section we study equilibrium allocations under such
regulation. We will see that by regulating the levels of prices and production, the government
of country S can indeed internalize the externalities, and that a consequence of this will be
deviations of prices from the Hotelling rule. However, this type of monopolistic behavior by
country S introduces a new externality due to its inability to commit to providing attractive
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terms of trade to country A. Consequently, even though the monopolistic environment may
be more e¤ective at preventing war under certain conditions, it can also increase the likelihood
of war and may even make country S worse o¤ under others, despite its ability to act as the
monopolist (Stackleberg leader) in its interactions with country A.13
4.1 Timing of Events and Markov Perfect Monopolistic Equilibrium
We consider a simple way of modeling the regulation of prices and quantities by the country S
government, by allowing it to act as a monopolist and set prices and quantities recognizing
their implications for current and future economic and military actions. In particular, suppose
that the government sets nonlinear tari¤s to control both the level of the price of the resource and
its production. Given this resulting price-quantity pair, country A can still declare war. This
environment is equivalent to one in which country S makes a take-it-or-leave-it price-quantity
o¤er to country A. In what follows, we directly study a game in which country S makes such
o¤ers (and do not explicitly introduce the nonlinear tari¤s to save on notation).
More specically, we consider the following game. At every date t at which war has not
yet occurred, country A chooses the level of armament mt: Next, (the government of) country
S makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er zt = fxot ; cotg to country A, consisting of an o¤ered delivery
of xot units of the resource in exchange for  cot units of the consumption good. Country A
then accepts or rejects this o¤er, which is denoted by at = f0; 1g, with at = 1 corresponding
to acceptance. Conditional on rejecting the o¤er, country A then chooses whether or not to
declare war on country S. As in Section 3, the continuation payo¤ to country A following war
is V (w (mt) et)  l (mt), and the continuation payo¤ for country S is  .14 If country A accepts
the o¤er, then the ow utilities to households in countries A and S are u (xot ) + c
o
t   l (mt) and
 cot , respectively. If instead country A rejects the o¤er and does not declare war, then the ow
utilities to households in country A and S are u (0)  l (mt) and 0, respectively
We formally summarize the order of events for all periods t for which ft 1 = 0 as follows:
1. Country As government chooses a level of armament mt.
2. Country Ss government makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er zt to country A.
3. Country As government decides whether or not to accept the o¤er at. If at = 0, it can
declare war by choosing ft.
4. Extraction and consumption take place.
13Yet another alternative arrangement is one in which country S is restricted to set the price of the resource
but cannot distort extraction decisions. Clearly, such policies are a subset of the more general set of policies
we consider in this section, which allow general nonlinear tari¤s and thus permit country S to choose any price-
quantity combination.
14The additional cost of war  introduced for the renement of MPCE in the previous section is now taken to
be small or zero.
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The timing of events makes it clear that this is a dynamic game between the two countries.
We consider its Markov Perfect Equilibrium, which we refer to as Markov Perfect Monopolistic
Equilibrium (MPME). This equilibrium is similar to an MPCE with the exception that rm and
consumer optimality is no longer required, since country Ss and country As governments jointly
determine the transfer of goods across countries. In such an equilibrium all actions depend only
on payo¤ relevant state variables, which here include the endowment, et, and prior actions at
the same date. As we did in the analysis of MPCE, we dene strategies for dates t in which
ft 1 = 0 (i.e., for histories where war has not yet occurred).
Let country As strategy be presented by A =
n
mA ; 
a
A; 
f
A
o
. Here mA assigns an armament
decision for every et; aA assigns an acceptance decision for every (et;mt; x
o
t ; c
o
t ); and 
f
A assigns
a war decision for every (et;mt; xot ; c
o
t ; at), where this decision is constrained to 0 if at = 1.
Country Ss strategy is denoted by S and consists of an o¤er z for every (et;mt). We allow
mixed strategies for both countries though it will become clear later that only pure strategies are
relevant for all, except for knife-edge, cases. We next provide a formal denition of equilibrium.
Denition 2 A Markov Perfect Monopolistic Equilibrium (MPME) is a pair fA; Sg where
1. Given S, 
m
A maximizes the welfare of country A for every et, 
a
A maximizes the welfare
of country A for every (et;mt; xot ; c
o
t ), and 
f
A maximizes the welfare of country A for every
(et;mt; x
o
t ; c
o
t ; at) subject to ft = 0 if at = 1.
2. Given A, S maximizes the welfare of country S for every (et;mt) subject to (3).
Given these strategies, we dene the equilibrium continuation values fUA (et) ; US (et)g as
the continuation values to countries A and S, respectively, at the beginning of the stage game
at t conditional on no war in the past. Similar to equation (14) in the previous section, these
continuation values are given by
UA (et) = (1  ft) (u (xt) + ct + UA (et+1)) + ftV (w (mt) et)  l (mt) , and
US (et) = (1  ft) ( ct + US (et+1)) + ft ,
where we have removed the "o" superscript to economize on notation.
4.2 Analysis
We next characterize the MPME. We show that unlike in the competitive environment, the time
path of resource extraction is distorted away from the Hotelling rule.15 Despite this di¤erence
in price paths, many qualitative features of equilibrium are shaped by the same forces as in
15The key reason for distortions in the monopolistic equilibrium is the armament decision of country A: To
highlight how armament a¤ects the distortion, in the Appendix we analyze the case where country A can attack
country S without arming. We show that in this case wars never occur and the path of resource extraction satises
the Hotelling rule (16).
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the competitive environment, in particular, by whether the elasticity of demand is greater than
or less than one, which determines whether incentives to declare war increase or decrease over
time. We also show that country S may delay wars or avoid them entirely in some of the cases
when wars are unavoidable under competitive markets. Nevertheless, a naive conjecture that
the monopolistic environment will necessarily reduce the likelihood of war and will make country
S better o¤ since it is now acting as a Stackleberg leader and making take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers is
not correct. In fact, it is possible for war to occur in a monopolistic equilibrium in cases when
war can be avoided under competitive markets, and country S can have lower utility. Both of
these features are the consequence of a new source of distortion in the monopolistic environment,
resulting from the fact that country S cannot commit to making attractive price-quantity o¤ers
to country A; this, in turn, induces country A to invest in armaments at each date in order to
improve its terms of trade.
We rst consider the optimal strategy for country S for a given level of armament mt: Let
~US(et;mt) be the value function of country S when its makes the best o¤er that country A
accepts, starting with endowment et and armament level of country A equal to mt. This value
function is given by the following recursive equation:
~US (et;mt) = max
xt0;ct
f ct + US (et+1)g (18)
subject to the resource constraint (3), and the participation constraint of country A, given by
u (xt) + ct   l(mt) + UA (et+1)  V (w(mt)et)  l(mt). (19)
Constraint (19) requires the value of country A when it accepts the price-quantity o¤er (xt; ct)
at time t to be greater than its utility if it declares war and captures a fraction w (mt) of the
remaining endowment of country S. This value also needs to be greater than the continuation
value from rejecting the price-quantity o¤er but not declaring war. But it can be easily veried
that this latter option is never attractive for country A, and hence there is no need to specify it
as an additional constraint in the maximization problem (18).16
Moreover, it is straightforward to see that constraint (19) must bind in equilibrium, since
otherwise country S could make an o¤er with slightly greater transfers and would increase its
payo¤. Finally, if ~US(et;mt) is less than the payo¤ from war  ; the best response for country S
is to make any o¤er that violates (19). Thus in equilibrium, starting from (et;mt), the payo¤ of
16 In particular, this additional constraint can be written as
u (xt) + ct   l (mt) + UA (et+1)  u (0)  l (mt) + UA (et) .
Suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that this constraint binds. By denition, UA (et) = u (xt) + ct   l (mt) +
UA (et+1), which combined with this (binding) constraint implies that UA(et) = (u (0)  l (mt)) = (1  ), which
is necessarily less than V (w (mt) et)  l (mt), showing that (19) is violated.
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country A is equal to
V (w(mt)et)  l(mt) (20)
regardless of whether it accepts the price-quantity o¤er of country S. This implies that country
As best response is to always choose a level of armament maximizing (20). We dened this
level of armaments as m (et) in equation (8). Therefore, the equilibrium payo¤s for countries
A and S can be written as:
UA(et) = V (w(m
(et))et)  l(m(et)) (21)
and
US(et) = max
n
~US (et;m
(et)) ; 
o
: (22)
We next show that an MPME exists.
Lemma 2 An MPME exists.
Proof. See Appendix.
We now turn to the rst main result of this section.
Proposition 5 In any MPME, if ft+1 = 0, then
u0 (xt+1) > u0 (xt) if m0 (et+1) > 0, and (23)
u0 (xt+1) < u0 (xt) if m0 (et+1) < 0:
Proof. See Appendix.
The main technical di¢ culty in the proof of this proposition lies in the fact that the value
function US(et) may not be di¤erentiable and we use perturbation arguments in the Appendix
to prove this result. It is easy to verify this result heuristically if one assumes di¤erentiability.
To do this, let us substitute (21) into (18), taking into account that since ft+1 = 0, it is the case
that ~US (et;mt) = US (et). Take the rst-order conditions to obtain
u0 (xt)  u0 (xt+1) + l0 (m (et+1))m0 (et+1) = 0. (24)
Since l0 () > 0; equation (24) implies (23).
Proposition 5 shows that the key determinant of the growth rate of the shadow price of the
resource is whether country A increases or decreases armaments as the resource stock declines.
This result is driven by the inabilities of both countries to commit to future actions. If country S
could commit in period 0 to a sequence of o¤ers fztg1t=0; only a one-time investment in armament
by country A would be necessary and this would prevent war; the shadow price of the resource
would also grow at the rate of time preference, (1  ) =, as in the Hotelling rule. In our model,
such commitment is not possible. Country A needs to invest in armament in each period to
19
obtain better terms of trade from country S. In particular, given the timing of events above, it is
clear that country A will choose armaments at each date in order to maximize its continuation
value V (w (mt) et)   l (mt), since this will be its utility given country Ss take-it-or-leave-it
o¤er. This continuation value incorporates the sequence of future armament costs as well, and
so country S will take these into account also when deciding path of extraction and prices. To
develop this intuition further, let us substitute (21) into (19):
u (xt) + ct +  (V (w (m
 (et+1)) et+1)  l (m (et+1)))  V (w (m (et)) et) . (25)
Suppose that armaments increase as the resource stock decreases. The increase inmt implies that
constraint (25) becomes harder to satisfy over time. If country S extracts  units of resources less
in period t and  more in period t+1; holding everything xed, it changes the payo¤ to country
A by (u0(xt+1)  u0 (xt)) : In addition, it relaxes constraint (25) since the stock of resources is
higher so that armament by country A declines, and this allows country S to decrease the o¤er
of ct: Therefore, as long as u0(xt+1) u0 (xt)  0; country S can be made better o¤ postponing
resource extraction to next period. Thus, it must be the case that u0(xt+1)   u0 (xt) < 0 in
equilibrium. When the amount of armament is decreasing in et; this e¤ect works in the opposite
direction.
Proposition 1 showed that the sign of m0(e) is determined by elasticity of demand for the
resource. Using Proposition 1 we next obtain the following corollary to Proposition 5, linking
the direction of deviations from the Hotelling rule to the elasticity of demand for the resource.
Corollary 2 Suppose u(x) satises  u0 (x) = (xu00 (x)) > (<)1 for all x: Then in any MPME,
whenever ft+1 = 0, we have
u0(xt+1) > (<)u0(xt):
We saw in Section 3 that elasticity of demand played a crucial role in determining whether
incentives to declare war increase or decrease as the endowment of the resource is depleted. The
same e¤ect determines the equilibrium armaments for country A in the monopolistic environ-
ment. When  < 1, demand is inelastic and the value of the resource, V 0(et)et, increases over
time. This induces country A to invest more in armaments. Country S internalizes the e¤ect
of resource depletion on country As incentives to arm (as it can hold country A down to its
continuation value). It then counteracts the rise in country As armament costs by reducing the
rate of resource extraction. This is equivalent to a (shadow) price sequence growing at a slower
rate than the rate of time preference, (1  ) =. In contrast, if  > 1, demand is elastic and
the value of the resource and country As armaments are decreasing in the endowment. In this
case, country S can further reduce country As armament costs by raising the rate of resource
depletion.
We now turn to the analysis of the conditions under which peace occurs in the monopolistic
environment. A naive conjecture is that country Ss ability to regulate the price and the level
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of production of the resource makes wars less likely and its citizens better o¤ relative to the
competitive equilibrium. This conjecture is not correct, however, because of the commitment
problem identied above, which leads to a new distortion in this monopolistic environment.
Recall that at each date country S makes a price-quantity o¤er that gives to country A utility
equal to V (w (mt) et)  l (mt). It cannot commit to giving a higher utility to country A, unless
the latter invests more in armaments. So country A needs to invest in armaments at each
date to secure favorable terms of trades. Therefore, the monopolistic environment encourages
investments in armaments at each date whereas in the competitive environment country A did
not need to invest in arms in periods in which it did not declare war. Moreover, since country
S needs to give country A at least utility UA (et) = V (w (m (et)) et)  l (m (et)), it e¤ectively
pays for country As future costs of armaments, so country S may be made worse o¤ by its
ability to make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, or by its inability to commit to future paths of prices
and production. The next proposition exploits this new distortion and shows why the above-
mentioned conjecture is incorrect.
Proposition 6 Suppose u(x) satises (17). Then in any MPME,
1. War is avoided when  < 1 and
 l (m) >  (1  ) , (26)
2. War can be avoided when war necessarily occurs in an MPCE,
3. War occurs with probability 1 along the equilibrium path if  < 1 and
 l (m (e0)) <  (1  )  (V (e0)  V (w (m (e0)) e0)) (1  ) , and (27)
4. War can occur with probability 1 along the equilibrium path when war is necessarily avoided
in the MPCE.
Proof. See Appendix.
The rst part of the proposition shows that, under some circumstances, the ability for coun-
try S to control resource extraction allows it to avoid wars in situations in which the cost of
armament is bounded below by the cost of war. For instance if  =  1, so that war is innitely
costly to country S, then country S avoids war in any monopolistic equilibrium and this is true
even though wars may be inevitable in the competitive equilibrium. Similarly, if m < 1, war
does not take place in MPME for large but nite  . The second part of the proposition is a
simple consequence of the rst. When war is highly costly to country S, it still takes place, under
the conditions identied in part 1 of the proposition, in the competitive environment, but not
necessarily in the monopolistic environment (for example, war never takes place in MPME when
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 =  1). Note that in this case, country Ss utility will clearly be higher in the monopolistic
environment.
Nonetheless, parts 3 and 4 of the proposition show that the opposites of these conclusions
might also be true. In particular, if  is su¢ ciently low, o¤ers necessary to secure peace may be
very costly for country S, especially since it is implicitly paying for the costs of future armament.
In this case, wars can occur along the equilibrium path. More specically, in contrast to Section
3, country A needs to make costly investments in armament in each period, even if war does not
take place. This is because, as we noted above, country S cannot commit to making attractive
o¤ers unless country A has an e¤ective threat of war, and thus country A is induced to invest
in armament to improve its terms of trade. But this means that war will reduce future costs of
armament; consequently, to secure peace, country S must make o¤ers that compensate country
A for the costs of future armament. If these costs are increasing to innity along the equilibrium
path, then the cost to country S of such o¤ers will eventually exceed the cost from war,   ,
which means that war cannot be permanently avoided. More generally, this cost of war may be
su¢ ciently low that country S prefers to allow immediate war in the monopolistic equilibrium
even though war does not occur in the competitive equilibrium.17
In sum, allowing country S to control the extraction of resources introduces two new eco-
nomic forces relative to the competitive environment. First, it implies that country S controls
the externalities generated by competitive rms. Second, it also introduces a new strategic in-
teraction between the two countries because country S can control the terms of trade directly
but is unable to commit to making su¢ ciently attractive o¤ers to country A without armaments
by the latter. This lack of commitment implies that country A will have an incentive to use
investments in armaments in order to enhance its terms of trade. The rst force implies that war
can be avoided or delayed in the monopolistic equilibrium in situations in which it is inevitable
in the competitive equilibrium. The second force implies that, since country A must now invest
in armament under peace, war takes place in the monopolistic equilibrium even when it can be
avoided in the competitive equilibrium.
5 Extensions
In this section, we discuss several extensions that show both the robustness of the insights
discussed so far and indicate new interesting e¤ects. To simplify the discussion, we focus on the
monopolistic environment (sometimes briey mentioning how the MPCE is a¤ected). Also to
17Though, as we have emphasized, the commitment problem facing country S is essential for the result that
ine¢ cient war can happen in MPME, as in the MPCE commitment by country A to limit its armaments in the
future (say to be no more than some small  > 0) could also prevent war and may lead to a Pareto superior
allocation. For example, a commitment by country A that in the future it will only have no or little armament
implies that country S will have a high payo¤ from tomorrow onward and country A will have a low payo¤. If
country A chooses high armaments today, this would then force country S to make a large transfer today, and
from tomorrow onward, oil would be traded at undistorted market prices without war. This discussion highlights
that lack of commitment on the part of both countries is important for the presence of ine¢ cient war.
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simplify the exposition in this section we impose that  =  1 so that wars never occur in an
MPME.
5.1 Inter-Country Competition
In practice, international conict over resources can involve multiple competing resource-poor
countries. In this section we consider the implications of allowing for N resource-poor countries
labeled by i = f1; :::; Ng which compete over the resources from country S. The economy is
identical to that of Section 4, though the resource constraint is replaced by
et+1 = et  
NX
i=1
xit, (28)
where xit  0 corresponds to the consumption of the resource by the households (each of mass
1) in country i and cit R 0 again refers to the consumption good. The ow utility to country i
from its consumption of the resource and the consumption good is equal to u (xit) + cit and it
discounts the future at the rate . As such, country Ss ow utility from the consumption good
equals
PN
i=1 cit and it discounts the future at the rate .
At any date t, country i can invest in armament mit  0 at cost l (mit) and declare war. We
assume that if any country declares war, all countries join the war, so that we have a world
war. In such a war, the fraction of the remaining endowment of oil captured by country i is
assumed to be
wi (mit;m it) = 
h (mit)PN
j=1 h (mjt)
;
where m it = fmjtgNj=1;j 6=i is the vector of armaments by other countries,  2 (0; 1], and
h is increasing, continuously di¤erentiable and concave. These assumptions imply that total
amount of oil after the war is possibly less than the endowment before the war (and thus the
interpretation is that each of the N resource-poor countries invades part of the territory of
country S). Naturally, wi (mit;m it) is increasing in own armament and decreasing in the
armament of other countries. This specication is particularly tractable as it implies that the
continuation value to country i from war is equal to V (wi (mit;m it) et) l (mit) for V () dened
as in (4). Given this modied environment, fT = 0 now denotes that no war has been declared
by any country in periods t = 0; :::; T , and we let fT = 1 denote that war has been declared by
some country in period t  T .18
First note that, the MPCE in this extended environment with multiple resource-poor en-
vironment is similar to Proposition 2. In particular, in the pure-strategy equilibrium, war can
only take place at date t = 0 and the Hotelling rule applies throughout. In what follows, we
focus on MPME.
18Our analysis can also be interpreted as applying to a situation in which only country i attacks country S and
it seizes a fraction of the oil which is decreasing in the armament of its rivals.
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At every date t, country Ss government publicly makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er to each
country i,

xoit; c
0
it
	
, consisting of a quantity of resource to be traded in exchange of the con-
sumption good for each i. For simplicity, we assume that rejection of the o¤er by any country i
automatically leads to world war.
The order of events for all periods t for which ft 1 = 0 is as follows:
1. Each country i government chooses a level of armament mit.
2. Country Ss government makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er

xoit; c
0
it
	
to each i.
3. Each country i government decides whether or not to declare world war.
4. Consumption takes place.
Using this framework, we can dene the MPME as in Section 4. We dene Ui (et) as the
continuation value to country i conditional on et and ft 1 = 0 and we dene US (et) analogously
for country S. Since  =  1, war is always avoided along the equilibrium path.
By the same reasoning as in Section 4, country i chooses the level of armament at each date
to maximize its payo¤ from war in order to receive the most favorable o¤er from country S.
More specically, it must be that in equilibrium mit = emi (et;m it) for
emi (et;m it) = arg max
mi0
V (wi (mi;m it) et)  l (mi) , (29)
is uniquely dened, satises emi (et;m it) > 0 and is a continuously di¤erentiable function in all
of its elements. This implies an analogous equation to (21):
Ui (et) = V (wi (emi (et;m it) ;m it) et)  l (emi (et;m it))
for all i where mjt = emj (et;m jt) for all j. Note that given this formulation, Ui (et) may not
necessarily be continuously di¤erentiable in each MPME, as it was in the case of Section 4.
To simplify the discussion, let us also focus on symmetric MPME, where mi (et) = m
 (et) for
all i and country S make the same o¤er to each i in each date. A symmetric MPME always
exists and in such an equilibrium Ui (et) is di¤erentiable (from a straightforward application of
the implicit function theorem). Since in a symmetric equilibrium all countries choose the same
armament m (et), we have that wi (mit;m it) = =N for each i.
Proposition 7 In any symmetric MPME,
1. For country i, resource extraction satises
u0 (xit+1) > u0 (xit) if m0i (et+1) > 0 and
u0 (xit+1) < u0 (xit) if m0i (et+1) < 0:
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2. If u satises
 u0 (x) =  xu00 (x) > (<) 1 for all x;
then m0i (et) > (<) 0 for all i.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 7 states that the shadow value of resources in country i grows faster or slower
than the rate of time preference, (1  ) =, depending on whether the level of armament is rising
or decreasing in the resource endowment. It is important to note that the argument leading to
this result relates to how armament for all countries moves as the endowment declines. Thus the
intuition for Proposition 7 is similar to that of Proposition 5 except that we must now take into
account how future values of the endowment et+1 a¤ect the armament of all countries jointly.
It is also noteworthy that in a symmetric equilibrium countries, by denition, armament
decisions of di¤erent countries will co-move as the endowment depletes. The second part of
Proposition 7, which is similar to Proposition 1, states that whether armament increases or
decreases as the endowment is depleted depends on the elasticity of demand. This co-movement
incorporates the best responses of each resource-poor country to the armaments decisions of its
neighbors.
To illustrate the complementarity in armament decisions across countries and its implica-
tions, let us consider a simple example in which we can explore the consequences of changing the
number of competing countries N . Suppose that preferences satisfy (17) so that the elasticity
of demand is constant. Moreover, let wi () and l () take the following functional forms:
wi (mit;m it) =
mitPN
j=1mjt
and l (mit) = mit. (30)
In this environment, it can be shown that the symmetric MPME is unique and involves:
mi (et) =

N   1
N

(1  ) 1=
 et
N
1 1=
. (31)
This means that conditional on per-country endowment level et=N , the level of armament is
increasing in military competition parameterized by (N   1) =N . Intuitively, if there are more
resource-poor countries competing for the same total endowment, returns to arming will be
higher and these returns will become more sensitive to changes in the per-country endowment.
Naturally, country S takes this into account in deciding the time path of extraction. This
reasoning establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 8 Suppose that preferences and technologies satisfy (17) and (30). Then in the
symmetric MPME,
1. There exists  > 0 such that u0 (xit+1) = (1=)u0 (xit) for all t;
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2. 1= > (<) 1= if  > (<) 1; and
3. j  j is increasing in N if  6= 1.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition states that under (17) and (30) the growth rate of the shadow value of
the resource is constant and depends on the elasticity of substitution . Interestingly, the last
part of the proposition states that the distortion in this growth rate from the Hotelling rule
is increasing in the level of international competition. The intuition for this is that as (31)
shows, when N is greater, the marginal benet of armament is also greater, implying that
global armament becomes more sensitive to changes in the resource endowment. For instance,
if  < 1 so that armament is increasing along the equilibrium path, an increase in the level
of international competition (captured by a higher N) raises global armaments (because of
the complementarities in armament decisions) and induces country S to further slow down oil
extraction so as to mitigate the rise in armament coming from all N countries (for which it is
paying indirectly through lower prices).
5.2 Armament in Defense
In practice, a defending country S can also invest in armament in order to deter an attack. In
this subsection, we extend the baseline environment to allow for armaments by country S. We
focus on MPME.19 More specically, at each t, country S can invest in armament mSt  0 which
costs l (mSt) whereas country A invests in armament mAt  0 which costs l (mAt) as before.
Country S still receives payo¤  in the event of war, though country As payo¤ now depends
on both countriesarmaments. In particular, it receives a fraction of the remaining endowment
w (mAt;mSt). We assume that w (; ) satises
w (mAt;mSt) = 
h (mAt)
h (mAt) + h (mSt)
;
where  2 (0; 1] and h is increasing, continuously di¤erentiable and concave.
The order of events at t if ft 1 = 0 is exactly the same as in Section 4 with the exception that
in the rst stage, countries A and S simultaneously choose mAt and mSt. Using this framework,
we can dene the MPME as in Section 4 with UA (et) and US (et) denoting the continuation
values to countries A and S, respectively, given endowment et.
By the same reasoning as in Section 4, at each t country A chooses the level of armament
that maximizes its payo¤ from war in order to receive the most favorable o¤er from country S.
More specically, it must be that in equilibrium mAt = emA (et;mSt) for
emA (et;mSt) = arg max
mA0
V (w (mA;mSt) et)  l (mA) .
19The analysis of MPCE is more involved in this case, though it can again be shown that given our assumptions
here, war must take place at date t = 0 (if it will take place at all).
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Given our assumptions on u (), w (), and l (), emA (et;mSt) > 0 and is a continuously di¤eren-
tiable function of its arguments. Since country Ss o¤ers make country A indi¤erent to war and
no war, a similar equation to (21) holds:
UA (et) = V (w (emA (et;mSt) ;mSt) et)  l (emA (et;mSt)) :
Moreover, analogous arguments to those of Section 4 imply that if ~US (et;mAt;mSt) corre-
sponds to country Ss welfare from its optimal o¤er conditional on et, mAt, and mSt, then it
must satisfy:
~US (et;mAt;mSt) = max
xt0;ct
f ct   l (mSt) + US (et+1)g (32)
subject to (3), and
u (xt) + ct   l (mAt) + UA (et+1)  V (w (mAt;mSt) et)  l (mAt) . (33)
Since we assumed that  =  1, country S always makes an o¤er which is accepted and
US (et) = ~US (et;mAt;mSt). Since constraint (33) will bind in equilibrium, we can substitute
(33) into (32) and obtain the value of mSt that maximizes US (et) is given by
emS (et;mAt) = arg max
mS0
 V (w (mAt;mSt) et)  l (mS) :
Clearly, when strictly positive, mS (et;mAt) is continuously di¤erentiable.
Note that given this formulation, and in contrast to our results in Section 4, UA (et) may
not be di¤erentiable. To facilitate the exposition in this subsection, we focus on a di¤eren-
tiableMPME where it is indeed di¤erentiable. Then, the rst-order conditions characterizingemA (et;mSt) and emS (et;mAt) are given by
V 0 (w () et) et h
0 (mAt)h (mSt)
(h (mAt) + h (mSt))
2 = l
0(mAt); and
V 0 (w () et) et h
0 (mSt)h (mAt)
(h (mAt) + h (mSt))
2 = l
0(mSt):
The convexity of the l function and the concavity of the h function imply that emA (et;mSt) =emS (et;mAt), so that w () is always constant and equal to =2.20 This means that in this
environment one can dene fmA (et) ;mS (et)g which represents two continuously di¤erentiable
functions corresponding to the equilibrium levels of armament for each country conditional on
the endowment et.
Proposition 9 In any di¤erentiable MPME, we have that:
20Note that h () and l () could be scaled by a player specic constant so that w () can be equal to a di¤erent
constant without changing any of our results.
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1. Resource extraction satises
u0 (xt+1) > u0 (xt) if m0i (et+1) > 0 for i 2 fA;Sg, and
u0 (xt+1) < u0 (xt) if m0i (et+1) < 0 for i 2 fA;Sg.
2. If u satises
 u0 (x) =  xu00 (x) > (<) 1 for all x;
then m0A (et) > (<) 0 and m
0
S (et) > (<) 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 9 states that the shadow value of the resource rises slower relative to the Hotelling
rule if m0A (et+1) and m
0
S (et+1) rise as the resource is depleted. The intuition for this result is
analogous to that of Proposition 5 except that in addition to considering the future armament of
country A, country Ss extraction decisions take into account how future values of the endowment
will a¤ect its own armament and through this channel also a¤ect country As armament (which
co-moves with country Ss armament).
The second part of the proposition states that if the elasticity of demand exceeds one, then
the armaments of both country A and country S decline as the resource is depleted along the
equilibrium path. The intuition for this result is the same as that for Proposition 1, with the
exception that it takes into account how country A and country S are choosing armaments
which optimally react to each other. In particular, when the elasticity of demand is less than
one, the same forces as in Proposition 1 push armaments by country A to increase over time.
The equilibrium response of country S then leads to increasing armaments by both countries.
5.3 Alternative Preferences
A natural question is the extent to which our conclusions depend on our assumption of quasi-
linear preferences for country A. In this subsection, we focus on MPME and show that the
general insights in Proposition 5 continue to hold. More specically, consider an environment in
which the ow utility to country A is equal to
u (xt; ct; mt) ,
where u () is increasing and globally concave in xt; ct, and  mt. Let limx!0 ux () = 1 and
limx!1 ux () = 0 . For simplicity, we assume that u () is dened for all values of ct R 0.21
Note that in this environment, the Hotelling rule can be written as:
ux (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1) =uc (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1) = (1=)ux (xt; ct; mt) =uc (xt; ct; mt) ,
21The analysis of MPCE in this case is similar to the baseline environment since u (0; 0; 0) is either nite or
equal to  1. Therefore, a direct application Proposition 2 shows that in any pure-strategy equilibrium, war can
only occur in the initial period.
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so that the marginal rate of substitution between the resource and the consumption good is
increasing in the discount rate.
Consider the order of events and dene the MPME as in Section 4. In this environment, we
can dene: eV (et) = maxfxt+k;et+k+1g1k=0;mt u (xt; 0; mt) +
1X
k=1
ku (xt+k; 0; 0)
subject to (5)-(7). Here eV (et) corresponds to the highest continuation value that country A
can achieve in the event of war and is the analogue of V (w (m (et)) et)   l (m (et)) in the
quasi-linear case. Let m (et) correspond to the value of mt associated with eV (et).
Proposition 10 In an MPME,
ux (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1) =uc (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1) > (<) (1=)ux (xt; ct; mt) =uc (xt; ct; mt)
if
m0 (et+1) +
eV 0 (et+1)
um (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1)

1  uc (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1)
uc (xt; ct; mt)

> (<) 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 10 states that the shadow price of the resource increases faster (slower) if ar-
mament increases (decreases) in the size of the total resource endowment, which is similar
to Proposition 5. Nevertheless, in relating this rate of growth to the rate of time preference,
Proposition 10 di¤ers from Proposition 5 because the rate of growth of the shadow price not only
depends on m0 (et+1) but also on an additional term (which was equal to zero when preferences
were quasi-linear). This term emerges because even in the absence of endogenous armament,
there will be distortions in the growth rate of the shadow price provided that the marginal utility
of the consumption good is time varying. Intuitively, when country As marginal utility from
the consumption good is lower, it is cheaper for country S to extract payments from country A
while still ensuring that country A does not declare war. Therefore, if the marginal utility of
the consumption good is higher (lower) today relative to tomorrow, country S will deplete more
(less) of the endowment today. Proposition 10 therefore shows that in addition to this force, the
sign of m0 (et+1) continues to play the same role as in the quasi-linear case.22
5.4 Further Extensions and Discussion
In this subsection, we discuss several alternative approaches one could adopt within the broad
umbrella of the framework developed in this paper. A full analysis of these extensions is beyond
the scope of the current paper, though we believe that this framework can be fruitfully developed
to study several of these.
22 It may be conjectured that in a richer environment with additional smoothing instruments such as bonds,
this marginal utility of consumption will not vary signicantly along the equilibrium path so that the dominating
e¤ect would come from m0 (et+1).
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A rst issue is how our results would di¤er if we focus on subgame perfect equilibria rather
than Markovian equilibria (e.g., as in MPCE or MPME). While the Markovian restriction in
the MPCE is not central, we cannot give a comprehensive answer to this question for the
monopolistic environment because characterizing the entire set of subgame perfect equilibria
turns out to be a very challenging problem. It can be shown that subgame perfect equilibria must
satisfy two incentive compatibility constraints, one ensuring that country A does not declare war
(which essentially requires country As continuation utility to be greater than (20) evaluated at
m (et) given by (8)) and one ensuring that country S does not deviate from the equilibrium
path of o¤ers given the current level of armament by country A (and anticipating that any
su¢ ciently attractive o¤er to country A can deter it from war). This description implies that,
similar to the MPME, country A will have an incentive to arm in subgame perfect equilibria.
For example, suppose that preferences satisfy  u0 (x) = (xu00 (x)) < 1 for all x. Since w (0) = 0,
it can be shown in this situation that V (w (0) et) =  1 for all et. Suppose that country A
chose 0 armament at date t, then country S could extract an arbitrarily large payment from
country A while still avoiding war since rejection of the o¤er would provide innite disutility
to country A. However, this would not be incentive compatible for country A at the armament
stage since it could instead deviate to armament level m (et), go to war, and make itself strictly
better o¤. This implies that subgame perfect equilibria have much in common with MPME
and su¤er from the same commitment problem on the part of country S i.e., country S will
be unable to commit to o¤ering attractive terms of trade to country A if the latter does not
invest in armaments. However, a full characterization of the path of distortions requires us to
rst determine the worst subgame perfect equilibriumfrom the viewpoint of both countries,
which turns out to be very di¢ cult. For this reason, we have focused on Markovian equilibria,
even though the argument here suggests that certain economic insights continue to hold with
subgame perfect equilibria.
A second issue is whether alternative arrangements could emerge as a way of preventing war
and the costs of armaments. One possibility would be a leasing agreement, where country S
may sell or lease its oil elds to country A, thus reducing or eliminating future armaments. We
believe that this is an interesting possibility, though it raises its own set of commitment issues. In
particular, in the same way that country S can renege on any promise concerning future prices,
it can renege on its lease contract and nationalizethe oil elds. Then country A would need
to arm in order to ensure that its lease contract is not violated. If we again focus on Markovian
equilibria, violation of lease contracts may be attractive to country S, and may preclude leasing
along the equilibrium path. On the other hand, it may well be the case that country A could
protect the lease contract with lower investment in armaments than the one necessary for war.
This discussion highlights that the exact implications of leasing would depend on how leasing
di¤ers from spot market transactions, particularly in regards to the type of military might that
needs to be exercised to support such transactions.
A related but distinct issue is that country S may voluntarily choose to be colonizedby
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country A instead of going to war. Such colonization might be attractive relative to the payo¤
from war,  . Such an arrangement, however, raises new issues. Country A may again be forced
to invest in armaments in order to protect these resources, for example, against an insurrection
from its colonial subjects. Once again, exactly what types of military investments need to be
made to support di¤erent types of contractual arrangements becomes central.
Yet another issue that can be studied using an extended version of this framework concerns
the nature of equilibrium when country A can switch to a di¤erent technology. For example,
when the resource in question is oil, country A could have access to a backstop technology in
the form of nuclear power, coal or perhaps green technologies. This possibility can be analyzed
using our framework, though the main results need to be modied because the Inada conditions
no longer hold and the possibility of a switch to another technology a¤ects incentives at all
points in time.
Finally, our framework ignores domestic political economy issues, which are obviously critical
in the context of exploitation of and conict over natural resources. For example, most of the
gains from natural resource income may accrue to an elite in country S, as they do, for example,
in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates or even Iran, while the cost of war may be borne
by all citizens. Similarly, in country A there may be di¤erent constituencies in favor of di¤erent
types of trade and military relationships with country S. The analysis of the interactions between
domestic politics and dynamic trade of natural resources is another interesting area which can
be studied by a (signicant) generalization of our framework.
6 Conclusion
This paper analyzed a dynamic environment in which a resource-rich country trades an ex-
haustible resource with a resource-poor country. In every period, the resource-poor country
can arm and attack the resource-rich country. When the resource is extracted by price-taking
rms, there is a novel externality as each rm fails to internalize the impact of its extraction on
military action by the resource-poor country. In the empirically relevant case where the demand
for the resource is inelastic and the resource-poor country can capture most of the remaining
endowment in a war, war becomes inevitable. Because the anticipation of future war encourages
more rapid extraction, equilibrium war happens in the initial period.
Externalities across price-taking rms can be internalized by the government of the resource-
rich country regulating the price and the level of production of the resource. This monopolistic
environment can prevent or delay wars even when they occur immediately under competitive
markets. The resource-rich country does so by making o¤ers that leave the resource-poor country
indi¤erent between war and peace at each date. Interestingly, this involves a deviation from the
Hotelling rule because, depending on whether incentives for war are increasing or decreasing in
the remaining endowment of the resource, the resource-rich country prefers to adopt a slower
or more rapid rate of extraction of the resource than that implied by the Hotelling rule. In
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particular, in the empirically relevant case where the demand elasticity for the resource is less
than one, extraction is slower and resource prices increase more slowly than under the Hotelling
rule because this enables the resource-rich country to slow down the rise in armaments, for which
it is paying indirectly. Conversely, when demand is elastic, the resource-rich country can reduce
armament costs by adopting a more rapid path of resource extraction than the one implied by
Hotelling rule.
Nevertheless, a naive conjecture that regulation of prices and quantities by the resource-rich
country will necessarily prevent war and make its citizens necessarily better o¤ is also incorrect.
The monopolistic environment, which allows for such regulation and in fact gives the resource-
rich country the ability to make take-it-or-leave-it o¤ers, leads to a di¤erent type of distortion:
because the resource-rich country cannot commit to making attractive o¤ers to the resource-
poor country without the latter arming, the equilibrium path involves armaments at each date.
The resource-rich country must then, implicitly, pay the future costs of armaments in order to
prevent war. This might, paradoxically, make war more likely than the competitive equilibrium.
Finally, we also show that the main insights generalize to the case where there are sev-
eral countries competing for resources and where the resource-rich country can also invest in
armaments for defense.
We view our paper as a rst step in the analysis of interactions between dynamic trade
and inter-country military actions. These ideas appear particularly important in the context
of natural resources since their trade is necessarily dynamic and international trade in natural
resources has historically been heavily a¤ected by military conict or the threat thereof. Despite
the simplicity of the economic environment studied here, both under competitive markets and
when the resource-rich country can regulate prices and quantities, there are rich interactions
between economic equilibria and international conict. In particular, the path of prices is a¤ected
by the future probabilities of war, while simultaneously the likelihood of war is shaped by the
paths of prices and quantities. We think that further study of dynamic interactions between
trade, international conict and political economy, including the several areas mentioned in
subsection 5.4, is a fruitful area for future research.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Proof from Section 2
Proof of Proposition 1
The rst-order condition to (8) denes m (e) as
l0 (m) = V 0 (w (m) e)w0 (m) e for all e. (34)
Given the solution to (4), the envelope condition implies that
V 0 (w (mt) et) = ku0 (xt+k) 8k  0: (35)
Substitution of (35) into (34) followed by implicit di¤erentiation yields
l00 (mt)
ku00 (xt+k)w0 (mt) et
  u
0 (xt+k)w00 (mt)
u00 (xt+k)w0 (mt)

dmt
det
=
dxt+k
det
+
u0 (xt+k)
u00 (xt+k) et
. (36)
Summing up (5) and (6) one obtains
1X
k=0
xt+k = w (mt) et (37)
di¤erentiation of which implies
1X
k=0
dxt+k
det
= w (mt) + w
0 (mt) et
dmt
det
. (38)
Taking the sum of (36) 8k  0 and substitution into the above equation yields
dmt
det
=
w (mt)

1 +
P1
k=0
u0 (xt+k)
u00 (xt+k)xt+k
xt+k
w (mt) et

P1
k=0

l00 (mt)
ku00 (xt+k)w0 (mt) et
  u
0 (xt+k)w00 (mt)
u00 (xt+k)w0 (mt)

  w0 (mt) et
: (39)
Since the denominator is negative, (39) is positive if and only if the numerator is negative. If
 u0 (xt+k) =u00 (xt+k)xt+k > 1 8xt+k then the numerator is negative since from (37),
P1
k=0
xt+k
w (mt) et
=
1, and the opposite holds if  u0 (xt+k) =u00 (xt+k)xt+k < 1 8xt+k. 
7.2 Proofs from Section 3
33
Denition of Strategies at et = 0 for u (0) =  1
As noted in the text, when the endowment equals 0 and u (0) =  1, then in the unperturbed
economy the payo¤ from war and from peace may both equal  1. We determine whether or
not war occurs in this case by explicitly looking at the economy with cost of war  > 0 for
country A as specied in Denition 1. Let
UC (e) =
1X
t=0
t
 
u (ext (e))  u0 (ext (e)) ext (e) (40)
for fext (e) ; et (e)g1t=0 which satises
u0 (ext+1 (e)) = (1=)u0 (ext (e)) ,et+1 (e) = et (e)  ext (e) , and e0 (e) = e.
UC (e) corresponds to equilibrium welfare of country A in a permanently peaceful competitive
equilibrium starting from endowment e at date 0, where ext (e) and et (e) correspond to the
resource consumption and resource endowment, respectively, at date t in such an equilibrium.
For cost of war   0, we dene
F (e)  UC (e)  (V (w (m (e)) e)  l (m (e))  ) . (41)
F (e) corresponds to the di¤erence in country As welfare between a permanently peaceful
competitive equilibrium and war with optimal armament m (e) starting from endowment e
when the cost of war is equal to . In what follows, we will not separately give the expressions
for the case where  = 0, which can be readily obtained from the expressions here by setting
 = 0. Following the fourth requirement of the denition of MPCE, we will determine the
behavior of country A at zero endowment (when u (0) =  1) from this function F (e). In
particular, given this function, our denition in the text implies:
Observation (Equilibrium Selection) Suppose that ft 1 = 0 and et = 0. Then ft = 0 only
if lime!0 F (e) > 0.
Note that this denition also subsumes the case for which u (0) >  1, as in this case
lime!0 F (e) =  > 0 and thus ft = 0 at et = 0. The following lemma and its corollary are
useful to simplify the analysis of country As equilibrium decisions. Because all of our results
in this Appendix are true for any value of  > 0, we do not qualify the next lemma and other
lemmas and propositions with x some  > 0.
Lemma 3 Starting from any et , country As payo¤ UA (et ) must satisfy
UA (e

t ) = max

u
 
xAt
  ptxAt + UA  et+1 ; V (w (m (et)) et )  l (m (et ))  	 (42)
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Proof. By denition of MPCE, UA (et ) equals (14) for some equilibrium sequence

et+k; p

t+k; x
S
t+k; x
A
t+k
	1
k=0
which does not depend on mt chosen by country A: Therefore without loss of generality country
A can make a joint decision over choice of (ft;mt) to maximize its payo¤ (14), which would be
either setting ft = 1 and mt = m(et); or ft = 0 and mt = 0:
The immediate implication of this lemma is the following corollary.
Corollary 3 In any MPCE, without loss of generality country As strategies in state e can be
restricted to choosing no armament and no attack with probability (e) and armament m(e)
and attack with probability 1  (e):
Proof of Lemma 1
We prove existence of MPCE using the properties of F: We construct equilibria for three
separate cases: (i) lime!0 F(e)  0; (ii) lime!0 F(e) > 0; and there does not exist e  e0 such
that F(e) < 0; and (iii) lime!0 F(e) > 0 and there exists e  e0 such that F(e) < 0: We
prove each case in a separate lemma. Throughout we use the result of Corollary 3 that allows
us to restrict strategies of country A to not arm and not attack with probability (et) and arm
m(et) and attack with probability 1  (et)
Lemma 4 If lime!0 F(e)  0 then there exists an equilibrium in which war occurs in period 0
with probability 1:
Proof. First, note that if u(0) is nite then lime!0 F(e) = : Therefore lime!0 F(e)  0
implies that u(0) =  1:
We construct an equilibrium (; ) in which war occurs with probability 1 in period 0. Let
e0; p0; xS0 ; xA0
	
= fe0; u0(e0); e0; e0g and

et ; pt ; xSt ; xAt
	
= f0; u0(0); 0; 0g for all t > 0: Let
 =

et ; pt ; xSt ; xAt
	1
t=0
: Let strategies of county A be (e0) = 0 and (0) = 0:
To verify that this is an equilibrium we need to check that country A does not gain from
deviating from strategy : The payo¤ of country A from choosing no armament and no war in
period 0 is given by
u(e0)  u0(e0)e0 + UA(0) =  1;
where the equality follows from u(0) =  1: The payo¤ of country A from playing (e0) is
V (w(m(e0)))   l(m(e0))    >  1; therefore it is the best response for country A to play
(e0) = 0: Observation 7.2 implies that (et) = 0 is the best response in the states in which
et = 0:
To see that  is an equilibrium, note that (e1) = 0 implies that Pr ff1 = 0g = 0: Then
(3), (10), (12), and (13) imply that

p0; xS0 ; xA0
	
= fu0(e0); e0; e0g and e1 = 0; completing the
proof.
Lemma 5 If lime!0 F(e) > 0 and there does not exist e  e0 such that F(e) < 0, then there
exists an equilibrium with permanent peace.
35
Proof. In an equilibrium with permanent peace country A sets (e) = 1 for all e  e0; and
equilibrium allocations  = fet(e0); u0(~xt(e0)); ~xt(e0); ~xt(e0)g1t=0 where fet(e0); ~xt(e0)g1t=0 are
the competitive equilibrium allocations with permanent peace dened in (40). At every date t
the payo¤ for country A along the equilibrium path is given by UC(et(e0)): Since et(e0)  e0 for
all t;
0  F(et(e0))
= UC(et(e0))  (V (w(m(et (e0)))et (e0))  l(m(et (e0)))  ) ;
which implies (et) = 1 is the best response of country A. Given that country A never attacks,
 satises optimization conditions (3), (10), (12), and (13) :
Lemma 6 If lime!0 F(e) > 0 and there exists e  e0 such that F(e) < 0 then an MPCE
exists.
Proof. Dene be > 0 s.t. F(be) = 0 and F(e) > 0 for all e 2 [0; be): Such be exists because
F is continuous, F(0) > 0 and F(e) < 0 for some e: Let bbe be dened implicitly by e1(bbe) =be: bbe represents a value of initial endowment of oil such that in competitive equilibrium with
permanent peace, remaining oil reserves in period 1 are equal to be: We construct equilibria for
three di¤erent cases depending on the values of F(e0) and e0 relative to bbe.
Case 1. Suppose e0  bbe and F(e0)  0:We construct an equilibrium with permanent peace.
Dene  = fet(e0); u0(~xt(e0)); ~xt(e0); ~xt(e0)g1t=0 and t (et(e0)) = 1 for all t: The proof of
this case is analogous to proof of Lemma 5.
Case 2. Suppose e0  bbe and F(e0) < 0: We construct an equilibrium in which war occurs
with probability 1 in period 0. In this case dene  = fet(e0); u0(~xt(e0)); ~xt(e0); ~xt(e0)g1t=0
and 0(e0) = 0; t (et(e0)) = 1 for all t > 0: Given these strategies of country A; (; ) is
an equilibrium for the same reasons as described in the proof of Lemma 5. Since F(e0) < 0;
country A obtains higher utility under war and and thus 0(e0) = 0 is a best response in period
0. To verify that t (et(e0)) = 1 for all t > 0; note that e0  bbe implies that e1(e0)  e1(bbe) = be.23
Therefore in any period t > 0
UA(et(e0))  (V (w(m(et (e0)))et (e0))  l(m(et (e0)))  )
= UC(et(e0))  (V (w(m(et (e0)))et (e0))  l(m(et (e0)))  )
= F(et(e0))  F(be) = 0:
23This follows, for example, because the competitive equilibrium is e¢ cient and thus equilibrium allocations
f~etg1t=0 can be found recursively from
J(et) = max
et+1
u(et   et+1) + J(et+1):
Concavity of J implies that et+1 is increasing in et:
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Therefore peace is a dominated strategy for country A in all t > 0:
Case 3. Suppose e0 > bbe: We construct an equilibrium in which oil endowment in period 1
is equal to be followed by permanent peace from t  2: Probabilities of war in periods 0 and 1
depend on the initial conditions.
Let  
e0; p

0; x
S
0 ; x
A
0

=
 
e0; u
0 (e0   be) ; e0   be; e0   be
and  
et ; p

t ; x
S
t ; x
A
t

=
 et 1 (be) ; u0 (ext 1 (be)) ; ext 1 (be) ; ext 1 (be) for all t  1:
Let (e1) = u0(e0   be)=u0(~x0(be)): Note that (e1) is equal to 1 for e0 = bbe and monotonically
converges to 0 as e0 ! 1: Therefore (e1) is a well-dened probability. Set (et ) = 1 for
all t  2: Under this construction et ; pt ; xSt ; xAt 	1t=0 satises conditions (3), (10), (12), and
(13) (since they do not depend on the probability of war in period 0, (e0)). To check that
constructed strategies are also best response for country A starting from period 1, note that by
construction e1 = be and et < be for all t  2: Since F(be) = 0; country A is indi¤erent between
war and peace and is weakly better o¤ randomizing between the two outcomes with probabilities
(e1) and 1  (e1): Since et < be for t  2; F(et ) > 0 for t  2; and therefore (et ) = 1 is a
best response analogously to Case 1.
Finally we need to construct (e0): Note that under proposed equilibrium strategies country
A is indi¤erent between permanent peace and attack in period 1, and therefore its payo¤ period
1 is UC(be): Therefore, if country A does not attack in period 0, its payo¤ is given by u (e0   be) 
u0 (e0   be) (e0   be) + UC (be) : Then we set (e0) = 1 if
u (e0   be)  u0 (e0   be) (e0   be) + UC (be)  V (w (m (e0)) e0)  l (m (e0))  ,
and set (e0) = 0 otherwise. This completes construction of the equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 3
First we prove a preliminary result about properties of MPCE. By Corollary 3, without loss
of any generality, we can restrict attention to only two actions of country A in each period, to
not arm and not attack with probability (et ) and to arm m(et ) and attack with probability
1  (et):
Lemma 7 Let (; ) be an MPCE. Suppose that t = (et ) > 0 for all t: Then
1. Country A must weakly prefer permanent peace to war,
1X
k=0
k
 
u
 
xt+k
  pt+kxt+k  V (w (m (et )) et )  l (m (et ))   (43)
for all t; with strict equality if country A attacks with a positive probability (i.e. (et ) < 1).
37
2. The payo¤ in the event of no war satises
1X
k=0
k
 
u
 
xt+k
  pt+kxt+k = Kte1 1=t   1(1  ) (1  1=) (44)
where
Kt =
1

1
1  1=
0@1 +P1k=1 k
 
kY
l=1
 
t+l
!1 1=1A
 
1 +
P1
k=1
kY
l=1
 
t+l
!1 1= . (45)
Moreover, Kt is bounded from below, and Kt is bounded from above by
KC =
1

1
1  1= (1  
) 1= : (46)
3. (xt ; et ) for all et > 0 must satisfy
xt
et
 1  . (47)
4. Country As payo¤ in the event of war satises
V (w (m (et )) e

t ) = w (m
 (et ))
1 1= (1  ) 1= 1
1  1=e
1 1=
t  
1
(1  ) (1  1=) :
(48)
Proof. Since peace occurs with a positive probability at any t + k  t; the equilibrium payo¤
for country A should be equal to
UA(e

t ) = u(x

t )  ptxt + UA(et+1):
Iterating forward, this implies that
UA(e

t ) =
1X
k=0
k
 
u
 
xt+k
  pt+kxt+k
for all t + k  0: Substitution into (42) implies that (43) must hold, with strict equality if
 (et ) < 1. This establishes part (i).
Consider any ft g1t=0 with t > 0 for all t: Optimal extraction for rms requires that
t+1p

t+1 =
1

pt . (49)
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If instead t+1pt+1 >
1

pt , then from condition (12) xAt > 0 since pt <1. From (10) xSt = 0,
but this implies that xSt 6= xAt which violates (13). If instead t+1pt+1 <
1

pt , then analogous
arguments imply that xAt+1 > 0 and xSt+1 = 0 which violates (13). (49) together with (12) implies
that
xt+1 =
 
t+1

xt . (50)
Forward substitution on (3) implies that
1X
k=0
xt+k  et . (51)
(51) must bind, since if this were not the case, a rm would be able to increase some xt+k by
 > 0 and increase its prots. Substitutions of (50) into (51), noting that the latter binds, yields
xt
 
1 +
1X
k=1
kY
l=1
 
t+l
!
= et . (52)
Equation (52) together with the fact that t 2 (0; 1] 8t > 0 implies that
et > 0 and
xt
et
=
1
1 +
P1
k=1
kY
l=1
 
t+l
  1   > 0 8t : (53)
Substitution of pt+k = u
0  xt+k into (44) yields
1X
k=0
k
 
1

x
1 1=
t+k
1  1=
!
  1
(1  ) (1  1=) = Kte
1 1=
t  
1
(1  ) (1  1=) (54)
where we used (50) and (52) to get (45).
We are left to show that Kt is bounded from above and below. The maximization of the left
hand side of (54) subject to the resource constraint (3) implies that xt+1 = 
xt so that the
maximum of the left hand side of (54) is
1

1
1  1= (1  
) 1= e1 1=t  
1
(1  ) (1  1=) . (55)
Since e1 1=t > 0 by (53), this means that
Kt  KC = 1

1
1  1= (1  
) 1= , (56)
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so that Kt is bounded from above. To see that Kt is bounded from below, note that if  > 1,
(45) implies that
Kt  1

1
1  1= (1  
)1 1=
since 0@1 +P1k=1 k
 
kY
l=1
 
t+l
!1 1=1A
 
1 +
P1
k=1
kY
l=1
 
t+l
!1 1= 
1 
1 +
P1
k=1
kY
l=1

!1 1=
= (1  )1 1=
If instead  < 1, then (43) implies that under any armament level m > 0,
Kte
1 1=
t  
1
(1  ) (1  1=)  V (w (m) e

t )  l (m)  . (57)
The rst order conditions which dene (4) imply that xt+1 = xt which given (5) and (6)
implies that
V (w (m) et ) = w (m)
1 1= (1  ) 1= 1
1  1=e
1 1=
t  
1
(1  ) (1  1=) . (58)
Together with (57), this means that
Kt  w (m)1 1= (1  ) 1= 1
1  1=  
l (m) + 
e
1 1=
t
 w (m)1 1= (1  ) 1= 1
1  1=  
l (m) + 
e
1 1=
0
where we have used the fact that et  e0. This means that Kt is bounded from below.
This establishes part (ii) of the lemma. Part (iii) follows from (53), and part (iv) follows by
substitution of m (et) in for m in (58).
Now we are ready to prove Proposition 3. Here we prove a stronger version of Proposition
3 that shows that if at any node of the game (both on and o¤ equilibrium path) war does not
occur with probability 1, then permanent peace must follow after that node.
Proposition 11 Let (; ) be an MPCE. Suppose that (eT ) > 0 for some e

T > 0: Then
(et) = 1 for all t > T: Moreover, UA(eT ) = U
C(eT ) where U
C(eT ) is a payo¤ in permanent
peace dened in equation (40) and fxt g1t=T satises (16).
Proof. First, note that using the same arguments as those used in Proposition 2 we can establish
that if (eT ) > 0 for some e

T > 0 then 
(et) > 0 for all t > T . Now substituting from Lemma
40
7 into equation (43), we obtain
Kte
1 1=
t  w (m (et ))1 1= (1  ) 1=
1
1  1=e
1 1=
t   l (m (et ))  : (59)
We now show that (59) cannot hold with equality which proves that there cannot equilibrium
randomization by country A between war and peace. Suppose (59) holds with equality at some
date t > T: We consider two cases separately: case 1, when there is some nite date T^ after
which country A never attacks, and case 2, when t < 1 innitely often.
Case 1. Suppose there is some T^ such that 
T^
< 1 and t = 1 for all t > T^ : In this case,
since country A is indi¤erent between war and peace at T^ and weakly prefers peace at T^   1
and T^ + 1 to war using the same armament as at T^ , it follows that:
KT^+1e
1 1=
T^+1
 w

m

e
T^
1 1=
(1  ) 1= 1
1  1=e
1 1=
T^+1
  l

m

e
T^

   (60)
KT^ e
1 1=
T^
= w

m

e
T^
1 1=
(1  ) 1= 1
1  1=e
1 1=
T^
  l

m

e
T^

   (61)
KT^ 1e
1 1=
T^ 1  w

m

e
T^
1 1=
(1  ) 1= 1
1  1=e
1 1=
T^ 1   l

m

e
T^

   (62)
Since t = 1 8t  T^ + 1, from (45), it must be the case that KT^+1 = KT^ = KC for KC dened
in (46), and since T^ 2 (0; 1), it must be that KC > KT^ 1 since war is chosen with positive
probability at T^ . Moreover, it must be that
KC   w

m

e
T^
1 1=
(1  ) 1= 1
1  1= < 0
in order that (61) hold. Equations (60)  (62) therefore imply that
e
1 1=
T^
e
1 1=
T^+1
 1 and
e
1 1=
T^
e
1 1=
T^ 1
 1.
If  < 1, then by (3) this implies that e
T^+1
= e
T^
so that x
T^
= 0 which violates (47). If instead
 > 1, then this implies that e
T^
 e
T^ 1 which implies x

T^ 1 = 0, which violates (47). This
establishes that it country A cannot be indi¤erent between attack and not attack in period T;
which implies that it must choose ft = 0 with probability 1.
Case 2. Suppose t < 1 innitely often.
Consider sequence s1 = ft ;Ktg1t=0 where Kt is dened by (45). By Lemma 7, there exists
some compact set S such that (t ;Kt) 2 S for all t: Therefore we can select a convergent
subsequence s2 within s1 (where Kt converges to some K). Consider three consecutive elements
of s2, denoted by n   1, n, and n + 1. Weak preference for peace at n   1 and n + 1 together
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with indi¤erence to peace at n using armament m (en) implies:
Kn+1e
1 1=
n+1  w (m (en))1 1= (1  ) 1=
1
1  1=e
1 1=
n+1   l (m (en))   (63)
Kne
1 1=
n = w (m
 (en))
1 1= (1  ) 1= 1
1  1=e
1 1=
n   l (m (en))   (64)
Kn 1e
1 1=
n 1  w (m (en))1 1= (1  ) 1=
1
1  1=e
1 1=
n 1   l (m (en))   (65)
Equations (63) and (64) imply that
Kn+1   w (m (en))1 1= (1  ) 1=
1
1  1=

e
1 1=
n+1  (66)
Kn   w (m (en))1 1= (1  ) 1=
1
1  1=

e1 1=n
and equations (64) and (65) imply that
Kn 1   w (m (en))1 1= (1  ) 1=
1
1  1=

e
1 1=
n 1  (67)
Kn   w (m (en))1 1= (1  ) 1=
1
1  1=

e1 1=n
Note that it cannot be that
lim
n!1

Kn   w (m (en))1 1= (1  ) 1=
1
1  1=

= 0, (68)
since if this were the case, then given the indi¤erence condition, it would violate (64) since
 > 0. Therefore, (68) cannot hold and the left hand side of (68) must be negative for (64) to
be satised. Then (66), (67) and the fact that Kn converges to some K imply that
lim
n!1
 
e
1 1=
n
e
1 1=
n+1
!
 1 and lim
n!1
 
e
1 1=
n
e
1 1=
n 1
!
 1,
which given (3) implies that if either  < 1 or  > 1, then limn!1 en+1=en = 1, but this violates
(47) which requires that et+1=et   < 1 for all t which implies from (3) that en+1=en  
for all n. This establishes that it is not possible for (et ) < 1 for t  T in an equilibrium in
which war continues occurring forever with positive probability, and this completes the proof of
the rst part of the proposition.
Finally, since country A weakly prefers peace in state eT ; UA(e

T ) = U
C(eT ) and fxt g1t=T
must satisfy (16).
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Proof of Proposition 4
To prove this lemma we construct the function F as dened in (41) and use Lemmas 4, 5, and 6
to establish the existence of equilibrium in which either war occurs with probability 1 in period
0 or there is a permanent peace depending on the assumptions in Proposition 4. Next we use
Proposition 11 to rule out other equilibria. Similarly to the proofs of all preceding lemmas, we
use Corollary 3 to restrict our attention to only two strategies for country A; not arm and not
attack with probability (e) and arm m(e) and attack with probability 1  (e):
First we derive payo¤s from the permanent peace UC(e) and war V (w (m (e)) e) : Set t = 1
for all t and use Lemma 7 to show that
UC(e) =
1

1
1  1= (1  
) 1= e1 1=   1
(1  1=) (1  ) : (69)
Then F(e) is equal to
F(e) =
1
1  1= (1  
) 1= e1 1=

1=   [w (m (e))]1 1=

+ l(m(e)) + : (70)
Part 1: Consider the case when  > 1: First we show that there exists a unique be such that
F(e) > 0 for all e < be and F(e) < 0 for all e > be: Then it follows immediately from Lemma
5 that there exists an equilibrium that has no war along the equilibrium path if e0 < be and
we show using Lemma 6 there exists an equilibrium in which war occurs with probability 1 in
period 0 if e0 > be:
Claim 1. If  > 1 then there exists a unique be such that F(e) > 0 for all e < be and F(e) < 0
for all e > be:
Note that F(0) =  > 0: Di¤erentiating F in (70) and use the optimality condition (34)
for m0(e) we get
F 0 (e) = (1  ) 1= e 1=

1=   [w (m (e))]1 1=

. (71)
If  > 1 then from Proposition 1 m(e) is increasing in e. Therefore F(e) has at most one
peak and it can cross zero at most once. If it crosses zero, let be be a solution to F(be) = 0: If
F(e) does not cross zero we set be =1:
Claim 2. If F(e) > 0 for all e  e0, then there exists no equilibrium in which war occurs
with positive probability.
Claim 2 together with Claim 1 immediately imply that if  > 1 and e0 < be then there exists
no equilibrium in which war occurs with positive probability.
Suppose there exists an equilibrium in which war occurs with a positive probability at date
0. More formally, suppose there exists an equilibrium (; ) such that (e0) < 1:
First suppose that (e1) = 0: In this case (10) and (3) imply that xA0 = e0 and e1 = 0:
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When  > 1; then F(0) > 0; and by Observation 7.2 (0) = 1: Therefore (e1) = 1 leading
to a contradiction.
Now suppose that (e1) > 0: In this case from Proposition 11, UA(e1) = UC(e1): Then
UA(e

1)  (V (w (m (e1)) e1)  l(m(e1))  ) = UC(e1)  (V (w (m (e1)) e1)  l(m(e1))  )
= F(e

1) > F(be) = 0;
where the strict inequality follows from the denition be: This implies that peace is strictly
preferred to attack and therefore (e1) = 1:
If (e1) = 1 so that peace occurs with probability 1 in period 1, then
 
xA0 ; p0

= (~x0(e0); u
0(~x0(e0)))
where ~x0(e0) is a permanent peace allocation dened in (40), and e1 = ~e1(e0): Since country A
attacks in period 0 with positive probability, it must be true that
V (w (m (e0)) e0)  l(m(e0))    u(xA0 )  p0xA0 + UA(e1): (72)
Substitute
 
xA0 ; p0

= (~x0(e0); u
0(~x0(e0))) and UA(e1) = UC(e1) into equation (72) and
regroup terms to get
0  u(~x0(e0))  u0 (~x0 (e0)) ~x0 (e0) + UC(~e1(e0))  (V (w (m (e0)) e0)  l(m(e0))  )
= UC(e0)  (V (w (m (e0)) e0)  l(m(e0))  )
= F(e0) > 0
which is a contradiction. Therefore there cannot exist an equilibrium with (e0) > 0 and
Lemma 5 establishes existence of equilibrium with (e0) = 1:
Claim 3. If  > 1 and e0 > be, then there exists no equilibrium in which peace occurs with
positive probability in period 0.
Suppose e0 > be and there exists an equilibrium in which country A chooses peace with
positive probability in period 0, i.e., (e0) > 0: By Proposition 11,
0  UA(e0)  (V (w (m (e0)) e0)  l(m(e0))  )
= UC(e0)  (V (w (m (e0)) e0)  l(m(e0))  ) = F(e0) < 0
which is a contradiction. Therefore in any MPCE (e0) = 0:
Part 2: Suppose  < 1 and let bw = (1=)1=(1 1=) : By construction, bw 2 (0; 1) :
Claim 4. If  < 1 and limm! mw(m) < bw; then there exists no equilibrium in which war
occurs with positive probability.
We prove that in this case F(e) > 0 for all e; so that we can apply Claim 2 of the proof of
this proposition directly to establishes this result.
In order to prove that F (e) > 0 8e, we show that F 0 (e) < 0 8e and that lime!1 F (e) > 0.
44
We can establish that F 0 (e) < 0 8e from (71); this is true given that w (m (e)) < bw 8e.
To establish that lime!1 F (e) > 0, consider rst the value of lime!1m (e). Suppose that
lime!1m (e) = m > 0. Since m(e) is the optimal armament, it must satisfy (34). The rst
order condition which characterizes (8) taking into account (4) and (17) implies
(1  ) 1= e1 1= = l
0 (m (e))
[w (m (e))] 1= w0 (m (e))
: (73)
If lime!1m (e) = m > 0; then this would violate (73) since the left-hand side of (73)
would converge to 0 whereas the right-hand side of (73) would converge to a positive number.
Therefore, lime!1m (e) = 0 which implies that
lim
e!1 (V (w (m
 (e)) e)  l (m (e))  ) =   1
(1  ) (1  1=)   , (74)
so that lime!1 F (e) =  > 0.24 This establishes that F (e) > 0 8e and Claim 4 follows from
Claim 2.
Claim 5. If  < 1 and limm! mw(m) > bw; then there exists no equilibrium in which peace
occurs with positive probability in period 0.
First we show that in this case lime!0 F(e) =  1: The existence of the pure-strategy
equilibrium with immediate war then follows from Lemma 4 and we will use Proposition 11 to
rule out existence of equilibria with a positive probability of peace in period 0.
Let us show that lime!0 F(e) =  1: Note that when  < 1; Proposition 1 that m(e) is
decreasing in e: Suppose that lime!0m(e) = m0 < m: This would violate (73) since the left-
hand side of (73) approaches1 as e approaches 0, whereas the right-hand side of (73) approaches
l0 (m0) =
h
[w (m0)] 1= w0 (m0)
i
<1, yielding a contradiction. Therefore lime!0m (e) = m and
lime!0w (m (e)) > bw. Now consider lime!0 F (e) which satises:
lim
e!0
F (e) = lim
e!0
(V (w (m (e)) e)  l (m (e))  )

UC (e)
V (w (m (e)) e)  l (m (e))     1

.
(75)
The rst term on the right-hand side of (75) converges to  1: The limit of the second term
is positive since after substituting UC (e) from (69) and V (w (m (e)) e) from (48) and applying
24 (74) follows because by denition
V (w (m (e)) e)  l (m (e))      1
(1  ) (1  1=)   
and because optimality of m (e) requires
lim
e!1
(V (w (m (e)) e)  l (m (e))  )  lim
e!1
(V (e)  l ()  ) =   1
(1  ) (1  1=)   l ()  
for any  > 0 chosen to be arbitrarily small.
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the LHopitals rule (together with the optimality condition (34)), we obtain
lim
e!0
UC (e)
V (w (m (e)) e)  l (m (e))   = lime!0
dUC (e) =de
d (V (w (m (e)) e)  l (m (e))  ) =de
=
1=
limm!m [w (m)]1 1=
> 1.
Therefore lime!0 F (e) =  1: Since lime!0 F (e) =  1 and F is continuous, there existsbe > 0 such that F(e) < 0 for all e < be:
Now we are ready to prove that there exist no equilibrium in which peace occurs with a
positive probability in period 0. Suppose such an equilibrium (; ) exists with (e0) > 0: In
this case by Proposition 11, (et ) = 1 for all t > 0 and xAt = ~xt(e0) for all t: From the proof
of Lemma 7 it follows that et = ~et(e0) = 
te0: Therefore there exists some T such that eT < be:
Since peace is the best response for country A in state eT ; its payo¤ UA(e

T ) should be greater
then the payo¤ from war, so that
0  UA(eT )  (V (w (m (eT )) eT )  l (m (eT ))  )
= UC(eT )  (V (w (m (eT )) eT )  l (m (eT ))  )
= F(e

T ) < 0;
where the last inequality follows from the fact that eT < be: This is a contradiction.
7.3 Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 2
Following the discussion in the text, the existence of an MPME is guaranteed by the existence of
a function US (et) which satises (22). Substitute (3) and (21) into (19), which holds as equality,
to obtain
 ct = G (et+1; et)  u (et   et+1)+ (V (w (m (et+1)) et+1)  l (m (et+1))) V (w (m (et)) et) .
(76)
Substituting (18) and (76) into (22) ; we can write US (et) as:
US (et) = max
ft=f0;1g;et+12[0;et]
f(1  ft) [G (et+1; et) + US (et+1)] + ft g (77)
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To show that US (et) exists and is well-dened, note that (21) and (19) imply that
UA (et) =
1X
k=0
k
0BB@
(1  ft+k) (u (et+k   et+k+1) + ct+k   l (m (et+k)))
+
 
ft+k
k 1Y
l=0
(1  ft+l)
!
V (w (m (et+k)) et+k)
1CCA
= V (w (m (et)) et)  l (m (et)) ,
so that
US (et) =
1X
k=0
k
 
  (1  ft+k) ct+k +
 
ft+k
k 1Y
l=0
(1  ft+l)
!
 
!
(78)
=
1X
k=0
k
0BB@
(1  ft+k) (u (et+k   et+k+1)  l (m (et+k+1)))
+
 
ft+k
k 1Y
l=0
(1  ft+l)
!
( + V (w (m (et+k)) et+k))
1CCA  V (w (m (et)) et)
for a given equilibrium sequence fft+k; et+k+1g1k=0. Consider the following problem:
(79)
eUS (et) = maxfft+k;et+k+1g1k=0
ft+k=f0;1g;
et+k+12[0;et+k]
8>><>>:
1X
k=0
k
0BB@
(1  ft+k) (u (et+k   et+k+1)  l (m (et+k+1)))
+
 
ft+k
k 1Y
l=0
(1  ft+l)
!
( + V (w (m (et+k)) et+k))
1CCA
9>>=>>;
 V (w (m (et)) et) .
Since ft = 1 is feasible, (79) is bounded from below by  . Moreover, since l (m (et))  0,
et+k   et+k+1  et+k  et, and V (w (m (et+k)) et+k)  V (et+k)  V (et), given et > 0, eUS (et)
dened in (79) is less than
max
fft+k;g1k=0
ft+k=f0;1g
8>><>>:
1X
k=0
k
0BB@
(1  ft+k)u (et)
+
 
ft+k
k 1Y
l=0
(1  ft+l)
!
( + V (et))
1CCA
9>>=>>;  V (w (m (et)) et) <1,
where the last inequality uses the facts that (i) V (et) and u (et) are bounded from above; (ii)
in view of Assumption 1 in the text, V (w (m (et)) et) is bounded from below for et > 0 (and
thus w (m (et)) et > 0), ensuring that eUS (et) is also bounded from above for et > 0. Therefore,
the solution to (79) exists and eUS (et) is well-dened for et > 0. This then implies that we can
rewrite (79) recursively as
eUS (et) = max
ft=f0;1g;et+12[0;et]
n
(1  ft)
h
G (et+1; et) +  eUS (et+1)i+ ft o , (80)
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as desired. It is also straightforward to see that eUS (et) in (79), and thus in (80), is uniquely
dened. This follows simply from the observation that any MPME is given by (79) (and vice
versa), and we have already established that for any et > 0, eUS (et) is bounded. 
Proof of Proposition 5
This is proved by a variational argument which considers a specic perturbation on the solution
in which starting from et, the choice of et+1 is increased by  ? 0 arbitrarily small, where this
increase is accommodated by a decrease in xt by  and an increase in xt+1 by .
Let et+1 denote the optimal choice of et+1 starting from et. Since ft+1 = 0, then ft = 0: Use
that for equation (77) to obtain
US (et) = u
 
et   et+1

+

V
 
w
 
m
 
et+1

et+1
  l  m  et+1 V (w (m (et)) et)+US  et+1 .
(81)
Since ft+1 = 0, (81) also holds replacing et with et+1 and et+1 with et+2, where et+2 denotes the
optimal choice of et+2 starting from et+1.
Optimality requires that the solution at et weakly dominates the choice of et+1+  for  ? 0.
Let xt = et   et+1 and let xt+1 = et+1   et+2. Optimality of the choice of et+1 implies
u (xt ) + 

V
 
w
 
m
 
et+1

et+1
  l  m  et+1+ US  et+1  (82)
u (xt   ) + 

V
 
w
 
m
 
et+1 + 
  
et+1 + 
  l  m  et+1 + + US  et+1 +  .
Since starting from et+1+ country S can always choose policy et+2 associated with et+1 together
with ft = 0, this implies that
US
 
et+1 + 
  US  et+1+ u  xt+1 +   u  xt+1 (83)
+V
 
w
 
m
 
et+1

et+1
  V  w  m  et+1 +   et+1 +  .
Combining (82) with (83) we achieve:
[u (xt )  u (xt   )]  

u
 
xt+1 + 
  u  xt+1 (84)
+

l
 
m
 
et+1 + 
  l  m  et+1  0.
Divide both sides of (84) by  ? 0 and take the limit as  approaches 0. This yields:
u0 (xt)  u0 (xt+1) + l0 (m (et+1))m0 (et+1) = 0. (85)
Since l0 () > 0, (85) implies that u0 (xt+1) > (<) (1=)u0 (xt) if m0 (et+1) > (<) 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6
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Part 1. Suppose that (26) holds. We can prove by contradiction that the equilibrium cannot
involve war for any et. Suppose there exists an MPME in which war occurs for some et: Consider
an o¤er by country S in state et that satises xot = (1  )w (m (et)) et and
 cot = u (xot ) +  (V (w (m (et   xot )) (et   xot ))  l (m ((et   xot ))))  V (w (m (et)) et) . (86)
This o¤er makes country A indi¤erent between accepting it, and rejecting it and declaring war.
We show next that the payo¤ for country S from making this o¤er strictly exceed the payo¤
from war  ; which implies that there exists a strategy for country S that gives it a higher payo¤
than the payo¤ from war.
Payo¤ for country S from o¤er (xot ; c
o
t ) is
u (xot ) +  (V (w (m
 (et   xot )) (et   xot ))  l (m (et   xot )))  V (w (m (et)) et) (87)
+US(et   xot )
 u (xot ) +  (V (w (m (et   xot )) (et   xot ))  l ( m))  V (w (m (et)) et)) +  
 u (xot ) +  (V (w (m (et   xot )) et   xot )  l ( m))  V (w (m (et)) et)) +  
 u (xot ) +  (V (w (m (et)) et   xot )  l ( m))  V (w (m (et)) et)) +  
The rst inequality follows from (22) and  l (m ((et   xot )))   l (m) : The second inequality
holds because w (m (et   xot ))  1: The third inequality holds because Proposition 1 and  < 1
imply that w (m (et   xot ))  w (m (et)).
Note that xot was chosen so that it is the optimal amount of oil extraction for country A
when it owns w (m (et)) et of oil (i.e. it is the optimal xt in the maximization problem (4)).
Therefore
u (xot ) + V (w (m
 (et)) et   xot ) = V (w (m (et)) et) : (88)
Substitute (88) into the right-hand side of (87) to show that payo¤ from o¤er (xot ; c
o
t ) for
country S is bounded from below by  l (m) +  , which exceeds  if (26) holds. Therefore
war cannot occur for any et:
Part 2. Suppose preferences satisfy (17) for  < 1 and w (m) > (1=)1=(1 1=), then war
occurs with probability 1 in the MPCE by Proposition 4. Suppose that (26) also holds. Then
war is avoided in the MPME by part 1. To show that this is possible, suppose that l (m) = m
and w (m) = 2m  m2 for m = 1. Then the condition that w (m) > (1=)1=(1 1=) is satised
and any value of  <  = (1  ) satises (26).
Part 3. Suppose  < 1 and (27) holds. Suppose that war never occurs along the equilibrium
path. Using the fact that constraint (19) must hold with equality to substitute for ct; and using
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(3), (21, and (22) ; the optimality of a permanently peace equilibrium implies that for all et  e0:
US(et) = max
et+1
(
u (et   et+1) + V (w (m (et+1)) et+1)  l (m (et+1))
 V (w (m (et)) et) + US(et+1)
)
  (89)
Forward iteration on (89) implies that the equilibrium sequence fxt ; et g1t=0 must satisfy
US (e0) =
1X
t=0
t (u (xt )  l (m (et )))  (V (w (m (e0)) e0)  l (m (e0))) (90)

1X
t=0
tu (xt ) 
l (m (e0))
1     V (w (m
 (e0)) e0)
 V (e0)  l (m
 (e0))
1     V (w (m
 (e0)) e0) :
The rst inequality in (90) follows from the fact that et+1  et from (3) and from Proposition
1 which establishes that m0 (e) < 0 so that l (m (et+1))  l (m (et)) for all et. The second
inequality in (90) follows from the fact that the maximization of
P1
t=0 
tu (xt) s.t. (3) yields
V (e0). Given (27), the last inequality implies that US (e0) <  which means that the best
response for country S at t = 0 is to make any o¤er that violates (19) and leads to war.
Therefore, war must occur along the equilibrium path.
Part 4. Suppose  < 1, w (m) < (1=)1=(1 1=), and (27) is satised. By part 3, war occurs
in the MPME. In the MPCE, by Proposition 4 war does not occur. To show that it is possible
for w (m) < (1=)1=(1 1=) and (27) to be satised, suppose that
l (m) = m and w (m) = m= (m+ )
for  > 0. Let m =1 so that w (m) = . Suppose that  satises
 < (1=)1=(1 1=) ,
which is always feasible for  su¢ ciently low. Suppose that
1  
1=   1 <  (91)
which is always feasible for  su¢ ciently low. Finally, suppose that  and e0 satisfy
 (1  ) > e1 1=0 (1  ) 1=  (92)
  1  
1=   1 + w (m
 (e0))1 1=

1  
1=   1   

m (e0) + 

.
This is possible because  can be chosen to be arbitrarily close to zero from below and because
the right hand side of (92) becomes negative for su¢ ciently high e0. This is because m (e0)
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declines towards 0 as e0 rises by the arguments in claim 4 in the proof of part 2 of Proposition 4
which means given (91) that the second term on the right hand side of (92) becomes negative for
high e0. In this situation, the rst-order condition which characterizes m (e) given (8) implies
1 = w (m (e)) 1= w0 (m (e)) (1  ) 1= e1 1=;
which by some algebraic manipulation yields
l (m (e)) = m (e) = w (m (e))1 1=

m (e) + 
(1  ) 1= e1 1=.
which means that
(V (e0)  V (w (m (e0)) e0)) (1  )  l (m (e0))
equals the right hand side of (92) so that (27) is satised.
7.4 Proofs from Section 5
Proof of Proposition 7
Part 1. Dene eVi (et) = V w mi (et) ;mj (et)	Nj=1;j 6=i et
Given the discussion in the text, country Ss program can be written as:
US (et) = max
fxit0;citgNi=1
(
 
NX
i=1
cit + US (et+1)
)
s.t. (28) and (93)
u (xit) + cit + 
eVi (et+1)   l (mi (et+1)) = eVi (et) 8i (94)
Now consider the solution given that ft = ft+1 = 0. Let xit and e

t+1 denotes the implied optimal
choice of et+1 starting from et so that
US (et) =
NX
i=1

u (xit) + 
heVi  et+1  l  m  et+1i  eVi (et)+ US  et+1 . (95)
Since ft+1 = 0, (95) also holds replacing et with et+1 and et+1 with et+2, where et+2 denotes
the optimal choice of et+2 starting from et+1. Optimality requires that the solution at et weakly
dominates the choice of et+1+ for  ? 0 where this is achieved by reducing xit by . Optimality
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of the choice of et+1 implies
u (xit) + 
NX
j=1
heVj  et+1  l  mj  et+1i+ US  et+1  (96)
u (xit   ) + 
NX
j=1
heVj  et+1 +   l  mj  et+1 + i+ US  et+1 +  .
Since starting from et+1 +  country S can always choose policy et+2 associated with et+1 so
that xit+1 is increased by  this implies that
US
 
et+1 + 
  US  et+1+ u  xit+1 +   u  xit+1 (97)
+
NX
j=1
heVj  et+1  eVj  et+1 + i .
Combining (96) with (97) we achieve:
[u (xit)  u (xit   )]  

u
 
xit+1 + 
  u  xit+1 (98)
+
NX
j=1


l
 
mj
 
et+1 + 
  l  mj  et+1  0.
Divide both sides of (98) by  ? 0 and take the limit as  approaches 0. This yields:
u0 (xit)  u0 (xit+1) +
NX
j=1
l0
 
mj (et+1)

m0j (et+1) = 0. (99)
Since l0 () > 0, (99) implies that u0 (xit+1) > (<) (1=)u0 (xit) if m0j (et+1) > (<) 0 8j. Since
m0i (et) = m
0
j (et+1) for all j, this implies that this depends only on the sign of m
0
i (et).
Part 2. At each t, given et, equilibrium prole of armaments mt is such that mit is the
same for all countries, which implies that wi (mi;m it) = =N and that
wimit (mit;m it) = h
0 (mi)
P
j 6=i h (mj)hP
j h (mj)
i2
=
h0 (mit)
h (mit)
wi (mit;m it)

1  1

wi (mit;m it)

= 
h0 (mit)
h (mit)
N   1
N2
.
This implies that the rst-order condition which characterizes equilibrium armament mi (et)
is uniquely dened by
V 0 (et=N) et
N   1
N2
h0 (mi (et))
h (mi (et))
= l0 (mi (et)) . (100)
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Given the solution to (4), the envelope condition implies that
V 0 (et=N) = ku0 (xit+k) 8k  0: (101)
Substitution of (101) into (100) followed by implicit di¤erentiation yields
u0 (xit+k)
u00 (xit+k)

l00 (mi (et))
l0 (mi (et))
+

h0 (mi (et))
h (mi (et))
  h
00 (mi (et))
h0 (mi (et))

dmit
det
=
dxit+k
det
+
u0 (xit+k)
u00 (xit+k) et
(102)
Summing up (5) and (6) one obtains
1X
k=0
xit+k = et=N (103)
di¤erentiation of which implies
1X
k=0
dxit+k
det
= =N .
Taking the sum of (102) 8k  0 and substitution into the above equation yields
dmit
det
=

N

1 +
P1
k=0
u0 (xit+k)
u00 (xit+k)xit+k
xit+k
et=N


l00 (mi (et))
l0 (mi (et))
+

h0 (mi (et))
h (mi (et))
  h
00 (mi (et))
h0 (mi (et))
P1
k=0
u0 (xit+k)
u00 (xit+k)
(104)
Since the denominator is negative, (104) is positive if and only if the numerator is negative.
If  u0 (xit+k) =u00 (xit+k)xit+k > 1 8xit+k then the numerator is negative since from (103),P1
k=0
xt+k
(et=N)
= 1, and the opposite holds if  u0 (xit+k) =u00 (xit+k)xit+k < 1 8xit+k. 
Proof of Proposition 8
We proceed rst by proving that US (et) is uniquely dened in the symmetric MPME, and then
we guess and verify a function for US (et) in order to prove the properties of the equilibrium allo-
cations described in the proposition. Given the symmetry of the equilibrium eVi (et) and mi (et)
are the same across countries, so that they can be denoted by eV (et) and m (et), respectively,
and all countries receive the same resource consumption equal to (et   et+1) =N . Dene
G (et+1; et) = N

u

1
N
(et   et+1)

+ 
eV (et+1)   l (m (et+1))  eV (et) .
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Given (17) and (30), (100) implies (31). Therefore, G (et+1; et) can be rewritten as:
G (et+1; et) = N
0BBBBBBBBBB@

1
N
(et   et+1)
1 1=
1  1=
+
 
(1  ) 1=
1  1=
et+1
N
1 1=   N   1
N

(1  ) 1=
et+1
N
1 1=!
 (1  
) 1=
1  1=
 et
N
1 1=
1CCCCCCCCCCA
(105)
Substitution of (94) into (93) implies that country Ss optimal o¤er satises
US (et) = max
et+12[0;et]
G (et+1; et) + US (et+1) (106)
By analogous arguments to those of Lemma 2, there is a unique US (et). Let us guess and
verify that US (et) satises
US (et) = Q
e
1 1=
t
1  1= (107)
for some constant Q > 0. It is straightforward to see that under this assumption, and given
that the second line of (105) is increasing and concave in et+1, the program dened by (106) is
strictly concave and yields a unique solution characterized by rst order conditions. The rst
order conditions and the envelope condition for the program dened in (106) yield:

1
N
 1=0@   (et   et+1) 1=
+

(1  ) 1=

1   (1  1=)

N   1
N

e
 1=
t+1
1A =  Qe 1=t+1 (108)

1
N
 1= 
(et   et+1) 1=   (1  ) 1= e 1=t

= Qe
 1=
t . (109)
Dene  2 (0; 1) such that the et+1 which satises (108) and (109) also satises et+1 = et.
Substitution of et+1 = et into (108) and (109) allows us to combine both equations to cancel
out for Q, so that  satises
(1  1=)

N   1
N

(1  ) 1= =

1  


(1  ) 1= , (110)
which implies that  is independent of et and Q. Given (109), this means that Q must satisfy
Q =

1
N
 1= 
(1  ) 1=   (1  ) 1=

(111)
for  dened in (110). To complete the proof, we can substitute in for et+1 and Q on the right
hand side of (106) using the fact that et+1 = et and that Q is dened by (111) for  dened
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in (110), and this conrms that the original guess in (107) is correct.
To prove the rst part of the proposition, note that since et+1 = et, then this implies that
xit = (et   et+1) =N = (1  ) et=N . Therefore,
u0 (xit+1) = [(1  ) et+1=N ] 1= = (1=) [(1  ) et=N ] 1= = (1=)u0 (xit) :
The second part of the proposition follows from the fact that the left hand side of (110) is
positive (negative) if  > (<) 1. Therefore, if  > (<) 1, then for the right hand side of (110)
to be positive (negative) it must be the case that  < (>). To prove the third part of the
proposition note that the derivative of the right-hand side of (110) with respect to  has the
same sign as:
  1

+

1

  1



1   (112)
which must be negative. This is because if  < 1, then  >  so that (112) is negative and if
 > 1, then  <  and (112) cannot be greater than
  1

+

1

  1



1   =
1
1  

  1

+ 1

< 0:
Therefore,  is uniquely dened. It follows that if  < 1, the left-hand side of (110) declines as
N rises, so that  rises as N rises. Alternatively, if  > 1, the the left-hand side of (110) rises
as N rises, so that  declines as N rises, which completes the argument.
Proof of Proposition 9
Part 1. Given the discussion in the text, country Ss program can be written as:
US (et) = max
xt0;ct
f ct   l (mS (et)) + US (et+1)g s.t. (3) and
u (xt) + ct +  [V (w (m

A (et+1) ;m

S (et+1)) et+1)  l (mA (et+1))] = V (w (mA (et) ;mS (et)) et) .
Now consider the solution given that ft = ft+1 = 0. Let et+1 denotes the implied optimal choice
of et+1 starting from et so that
US (et) = u
 
et   et+1
  l (mS (et)) +  [V (w (mA (et+1) ;mS (et+1)) et+1)  l (mA (et+1))](113)
 V (w (mA (et) ;mS (et)) et) + US
 
et+1

.
Follow the same perturbation arguments as in the proof of Proposition 5. This yields:
[u (xt )  u (xt   )]  

u
 
xt+1 + 
  u  xt+1 (114)
+

l
 
mA
 
et+1 + 
  l  mA  et+1+ l  mS  et+1 +   l  mS  et+1  0.
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Divide both sides of (114) by  ? 0 and take the limit as  approaches 0. This yields:
u0 (xt)  u0 (xt+1) + l0 (mA (et+1))m0A (et+1) + l0 (mS (et+1))m0S (et+1) = 0. (115)
Since l0 () > 0, (115) implies that u0 (xt+1) > (<) (1=)u0 (xt) if m0A (et+1) > (<) 0 and
m0S (et+1) > (<) 0.
Part 2. Analogous arguments to those of part 2 of Proposition 7 imply that mA (et) and
mS (et) increase (decrease) in et if  u0 (x) = (xu00 (x)) > (<) 1 for all x. 
Proof of Proposition 10
Analogous arguments as in the proof of Proposition 5 imply that mt = m (et), that
UA (et) = eV (et) ,
and that country Ss optimal o¤er must satisfy:
US (et) = max
xt0;ct
f ct + US (et+1)g s.t. (3) and
u (xt; ct; m (et)) +  eV (et+1) = eV (et) .
Let et+1 denote the implied optimal value of et+1 starting from et, and let et+2 denote the
implied optimal value of et+2 starting from et+1. Let ect () and ect+1 (), respectively, solve:
u
 
et   et+1   ;ect () ; m (et)+  eV  et+1 +  = eV (et) and (116)
u
 
et+1   et+2 + ;ect+1 () ; m  et+1 + +  eV  et+2 = eV  et+1 +  (117)
for  ? 0. Note that by implicit di¤erentiation:
ec0t (0) = ux (xt; ct; mt)   eV 0 (et+1)uc (xt; ct; mt)
ec0t+1 (0) =  ux (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1) + um (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1)m0 (et+1) + eV 0 (et+1)uc (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1)
Optimality requires that
 ect (0) + US  et+1   ect () + US  et+1 + 
  ect () +    ect+1 () + ect+1 (0) + US  et+1
which implies that ect (0)  ect ()   (ect+1 ()  ect+1 (0)) . (118)
56
Divide both sides of (118) by  ? 0 and take the limit as  approaches 0 so as to achieve:
 ec0t (0) = ec0t+1 () ,
which by substitution yields:
ux (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1)
uc (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1) =
1

ux (xt; ct; mt)
uc (xt; ct; mt) +
um (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1)
uc (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1) m
0 (et+1)
+eV 0 (et+1) 1
uc (xt+1; ct+1; mt+1)  
1
uc (xt; ct; mt)

,
which completes the proof since uc () ; um () > 0. 
7.5 Monopolistic Environment without Armament
Here we briey consider the implications of allowing country A to engage in war without the
possibility for armament. In particular, suppose that
w(m) = w 2 (0; 1] for all m; (119)
which implies that country A never invests in armament in equilibrium.
It is then straightforward to see that wars do not occur in any period. This is because
country S can always structure o¤ers to country A so as to replicate the outcome of war while
making itself better o¤ by avoiding war which costs it  .
Formally, if country A attacks country S over any stock of the resource et; country As
payo¤ is V ( wet) and its path of extraction of the resource following the war f~xt+k( wet)g1k=0 is
a solution to (4) when w(m) = w: Note that it satises
V ( wet) = u (~xt( wet)) + V ( wet   ~xt( wet)): (120)
It is feasible for country S to make o¤ers in equilibrium that replicate the payo¤ of country
A in the event of war. In fact, we can show a stronger statement that country S in any period
can make an o¤er that makes both countries strictly better o¤ than having a war. Consider an
o¤er ~zt = f~xt ( wet) ; g where  2 (0;  (1  ) ) : Since the payo¤ of country A in period t+ 1
is bounded by the payo¤ from attacking country S; V ( w (et   ~xt( wet))); its payo¤ in period t
from accepting o¤er ~zt satises
u(~xt( wet)) + + UA(et   ~xt( wet)) > u(~xt( wet)) + V ( wet   ~xt( wet))
= V ( wet)
where the last line uses (120). This means country A is made strictly better o¤ accepting this
alternative o¤er.
57
Similarly, the payo¤ of country S in period t+1 is bounded by the payo¤ from being attacked
 , since country S can always make an o¤er which is rejected.25 Therefore, country Ss payo¤
following the acceptance of the o¤er is
 + US(et   ~xt( wet))   +  .
Since  +  >  , country S is made strictly better o¤ so that war cannot be an equilibrium
with any endowment et:
Since wars are never an equilibrium, country S makes an o¤er zt to extract the maximum
surplus from country A subject to avoiding war. We can then show that such an o¤er always
satises the Hotelling rule. Formally, country Ss maximization problem is
US (et) = max
xt0;ct
f ct + US (et+1)g (122)
subject to (3),
u (xt) + ct + UA (et+1)  V ( wet) . (123)
With the same argument as in the text, the participation constraint is given by (123) and
this constraint must bind; if it did not, country S could strictly improve its payo¤ by o¤ering a
lower value of ct to country A. Therefore, in this case, UA(et) = V ( wet) for all et so that country
A is indi¤erent between attacking and not attacking country S in every period. Therefore, the
maximization problem of country S can be written as a maximization of (122) subject to (3),
and
u (xt) + ct + V ( wet+1)  V ( wet) :
The rst-order conditions to this problem establishes that xt must satisfy Hotelling rule (16).26
It is optimal for country S to equalize country Ss marginal rate of substitution over x to
the marginal rate of transformation since this is the most e¢ cient means of extracting payments
from country A. As an illustration of this intuition, suppose that u0 (xt+1) > u0 (xt). If country
S extracts  units of resources less in period t and  > 0 more in period t+1; holding everything
xed, it changes payo¤ of country A by (u0(xt+1)  u0 (xt))  > 0, which relaxes constraint
(123). This allows country S to reduce ct and hence increase the payments it receives from
country A. If instead u0 (xt+1) < u0 (xt), then analogous arguments imply that country S
could improve its payo¤ by extracting  > 0 units of resources more in period t and  less in
25Formally, starting from any et, country S can o¤er f0; 0g, which yields a payo¤ US (et) if it does not lead
to war and  if it leads to war. This implies that
US (et)  min fUS (et) ;  g =  , (121)
where we have used the fact that if it were the case that US (et) <  < 0, (121) would imply US (et)  0,
yielding a contradiction.
26To take the rst-order condition one needs to assume that US(e) is di¤erentiable. One can prove the same
result without assuming di¤erentiability by following the same steps as in the proof of Proposition 5.
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period t+ 1:
We summarize the results of this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 12 Suppose w () satises (119). Then in any MPME:
1. War never occurs.
2. The equilibrium sequence of resource extraction, xt, satises (16) for all t.
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